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The Navy needs to protect Destroyers (DDGs) from Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
attacks. The team, focusing on improving the DDG’s defenses against small radar cross 
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sensing and engagement capabilities in Microsoft Excel, and used Monte Carlo analysis 
of 500 simulation runs to determine that four out of eight incoming IED UAVs are likely 
to hit the ship. Sensitivity analysis showed that improving weapon systems is more effec-
tive than improving sensor systems, inspiring the generation of alternatives for improving 
UAV defense. For the eight feasible alternatives the team estimated cost, assessed risk in 
accordance with the requirements, simulated performance against the eight incoming 
UAVs, and performed cost benefit analysis. Adding CIWS mounts is the most cost effec-
tive alternative, reducing the average number of UAV hits from a baseline of 3.82 to 
2.50, costing $816M to equip the 62-DDG fleet for a 12-year life cycle. Combining that 
with upgraded EW capabilities to jam remote-controlled UAVs reduces the hits to 1.56 
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To improve a DDG’s defense against suicide UAV attacks, the most cost-effective up-
grades include installing two additional CIWS mounts, upgrading EW capabilities to jam 
remote-controlled UAVs, and installing radar decoy launchers to defeat radar signal-
seeking UAVs such as the Harpy. Simulation shows that against a mixed attack swarm of 
four remotely controlled UAVs and four Harpy UAVs, about four of eight incoming IED 
UAVs are likely to hit the baseline DDG without upgrades. Adding two CIWS mounts 
reduces the average number of UAV hits scored on the DDG from a baseline of 3.82 to 
2.50, costing $816 million U.S. dollars to equip the 62-DDG fleet for a 12-year life cycle, 
or $13.2 million U.S. dollars per DDG. Combining the CIWS installations with upgraded 
EW capabilities to jam remote-controlled UAVs reduces the hits to 1.56 for $1844 mil-
lion U.S. dollars, or $29.7 million U.S. dollars per DDG. Installing radar decoy launchers 
in addition to the CIWS and jammer upgrades reduces the hits to 1.12 for $2862 million 
U.S. dollars, or $46.2 million U.S. dollars per DDG. All of these estimates are in FY 
2013 dollars. 
The objectives of this project are to analyze the current United States Navy (USN) 
destroyer baseline capabilities for defending against UAVs, identify the capability gaps, 
generate alternatives for UAV defense, and use systems engineering techniques to deter-
mine the most cost-effective options for defending against UAV threats. 
The team first investigated the user need relating to UAVs, and found that UAVs 
are included in a need statement from the Maritime Expeditionary Security (MES) force 
Initial Capabilities Document (ICD): “Point defense capability to defend against limited 
air threats that penetrate Sea Shield local air defense umbrellas. The threat includes light 
civilian (general aviation) aircraft, small commercial aircraft and small radar cross-
section targets such as UAVs” (N857 2007). 
With the user need established, the team defined the Design Reference Mission 
(DRM), deciding to focus on the suicide UAV threat in a littoral environment. In the 
DRM, a DDG visiting a foreign port is spotted by non-state actor enemies, triggering the 
launch of 5 to 10 UAVs. Each UAV is fitted with an explosive payload, and because 
xviii 
 
some of the UAVs operate autonomously, the UAV operators attempt to attack the DDG 
with remotely controlled UAVs at the same time as the autonomous UAVs lock on to and 
attack the DDG’s radar. 
Some of the DDG’s current systems are appropriate for combating the UAV 
threat, but with others there is a significant gap. For the first step of the gap analysis, the 
team identified the current DDG systems and their capability to detect, track, and engage 
targets. The team further decomposed the detect-to-engage sequence in a functional flow. 
Detection includes classifying the contact as a UAV and identifying it as a threat. Defen-
sive systems are assigned to tracked targets, and after engagement, battle damage assess-
ment feeds back into defensive system assignment. The flow continues until the encoun-
ter ends with no targets remaining.  
 The team established a model of the baseline DDG using Microsoft Excel. The 
baseline model reflects an operational environment based on the DRM. The team ana-
lyzed and researched the current capabilities the DDG has to defend against a UAV 
swarm attack, and the identified information established input placeholder values for the 
baseline model. In order to keep this baseline model UNCLASSIFIED, the parameters 
are based on accessible publicly available data and assumptions for the unknowns. The 
team performed Monte Carlo analysis of 500 simulation results for a swarm of 8 UAVs 
attacking a DDG, as the goal was to output the number of inbound UAVs which score a 
hit on the DDG. Based on the simulation results, the baseline DDG would experience a 
significant amount of UAV hits; the most likely outcome is for four UAVs to hit the ship. 
With the model in place for the baseline DDG, a sensitivity analysis showed 
which types of improvements yielded the greatest effect on the model’s outcome. The 
sensitivity analysis involved varying several input parameters individually and comparing 
how each affected the number of hits scored by UAVs, so that system alternatives could 
focus on improving the most important parameters. The analysis showed that improving 
the ship’s sensors is not as effective as making weapon system improvements. Weapon 
systems would have to be improved a significant amount before the improvements’ effec-
tiveness becomes limited by targets evading sensor detection. Therefore, the team inves-
tigated system alternatives which focus on neutralizing, not detecting, UAVs. 
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Brainstorming generated many possible alternatives which the team then nar-
rowed based on the sensitivity analysis results; alternatives which only improve detection 
were excluded. The team selected all but the most infeasible remaining alternatives, in-
cluding upgrading the CIWS with the Laser Weapon System (LaWS), upgrading EW ca-
pabilities to jam remote control UAVs, procure a UAV to control from the DDG such as 
the Fire Scout and install onboard weapons to shoot down UAVs, launching radar decoys 
from the ship’s Fire Scout, installing additional small arms mounts on the DDG, in-
stalling radar decoy launchers on the DDG, installing reactive armor, using smoke gener-
ators to obscure the DDG and make guidance difficult for remotely controlled UAVs, 
launching a shrapnel-like chaff which would tear apart UAVs flying through it, and in-
stalling additional CIWS mounts. After some research, the team found reactive armor and 
the shrapnel chaff option to not be technologically feasible. 
For each remaining alternative, the team estimated cost, assuming a five-year pro-
curement and installation period (after system development and test) and a 12-year life 
cycle for sustainment. The team also assessed risk for each alternative, considering what 
obstacles could prevent that alternative from being implemented on the DDG as well as 
what could prevent it from performing its full intended purpose successfully. Risks were 
evaluated for each applicable system requirement, and included any suitability considera-
tions, as well as technology readiness. 
To assess effectiveness for each alternative, the team conducted a simulation of 
500 trials, and each trial resulted in a number of UAV hits scored on the DDG ranging 
from zero to eight. In order to demonstrate each alternative’s percent decrease in UAV 
hits scored on the DDG from the baseline model, the average number of UAV hits was 
recorded for both the baseline and the alternatives. Installing two additional CIWS 
mounts reduced the baseline number of hits the most, from 3.82 to 2.50. CIWS was fol-
lowed in modeled effectiveness by the EW remote control UAV jammer (2.57 hits), the 
Fire Scout-launched radar decoys (2.81 hits), the ship-launched radar decoys (3.05 hits), 
and the smokescreen alternative (3.24 hits), while the other alternatives yielded negligible 
improvement. 
Dividing the difference between hits scored with an alternative and hits scored 
with the baseline by the alternative’s cost allowed the alternatives to be ranked by cost 
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effectiveness. The team used the same method to find the cost effectiveness of combina-






With respect to the 21st Century, it is projected that future threats in addition to 
being deadly will be increasingly varied in their form and more widely dispersed. Future 
threats will be implemented with little warning of the intended target and size of the at-
tack. It is believed that in order to address these future challenges, the USN needs to 
evolve its previous strategy of maintaining a regional focus, to include transnational 
threats. In order to address these future challenges, the USN needs to further increase its 
capabilities to conduct sustained sea to land operations and increase the distance of its 
offensive capabilities. As is expressed in “Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capa-
bilities,” the vision for the USN is to increase its operational capabilities in order to ad-
dress the future threats (Clark 2002).  
From “Sea Power 21,” there are three fundamental concepts that express the vi-
sion of the USN’s increased operational capabilities:  Sea Power in the 21st century in-
volves what are referred to as Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. Sea Strike refers to 
the ability of the USN to project precise and persistent offensive power from sea. Sea 
Shield refers to the ability of the USN to provide defensive assurance throughout the 
world. Sea Basing refers to the ability of the USN to increase operational independence 
and support for joint forces (Clark 2002). 
Maritime Expeditionary Security (MES) forces are but one organization to assist 
in making Sea Power 21 a reality. The purpose of MES forces is to assist sea basing op-
erations by protecting the transit of supplies and additional assets required to sustain the 
operation. In addition, MES forces are to provide point defense for individual vessels, 
harbors, inland waterways, facilities, and stationed equipment in littoral regions. As a re-
sult, one of the core capabilities identified in the MES Initial Capabilities Document 
(ICD) is to “detect, identify, engage, and destroy Level I and Level II hostile air, surface, 
subsurface, and ground targets, day and night, and in most weather conditions in the litto-
ral battle space” (N857 2007). Currently, MES forces are unable to adequately fulfill this 
capability. An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) can carry missiles or act as an Improvised 
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Explosive Device (IED), and could be employed by terrorists (Level I threat) or be part of 
irregular (Level II threat) forces (N857 2007). 
Part of the Arleigh Burke-Class Aegis Guided-Missile Destroyer Flight IIA 
(DDG) mission is to assist expeditionary strike groups in littoral offshore warfare scenar-
ios (Vandroff 2012). A DDG partaking in an expeditionary strike group mission could be 
exposed to the threat of UAVs acting as IEDs. The UAV swarm threat becomes increas-
ingly credible as adversaries develop low cost implementations. Low cost implementa-
tions are made possible due to the low level of technology required to create UAVs act-
ing as IEDs. As a result, DDGs could face a swarm of attacking UAVs that have minimal 
autonomy and require that the operator maintains a line of sight with the aircraft and its 
intended target. In addition, other UAVs that require little to no manual operations may 
also be used. 
The combat systems of a DDG are centered on the Aegis Weapon System (AWS) 
(Gryphon Technologies 2011). The early design of the AWS focused on countering air 
threats that included aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), but was later upgrad-
ed to incorporate capabilities able to counter ballistic missiles (“The AEGIS Combat Sys-
tem,” Threston 2009). Characteristics common to these threats include fast flying speeds 
and large radar cross sections. While on a mission to assist MES forces, it is envisioned 
that a DDG will be threatened by UAVs that have slow flying speeds and small radar 
cross sections. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to believe that the DDG may be 
vulnerable to UAVs acting as IEDs in an MES setting. 
B. NEED STATEMENT 
The USN needs to ensure that a DDG has the capability to defend against a 
swarm of UAVs, acting as IEDs, in an MES setting. 
 
C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this project are to analyze the current USN destroyer baseline 
capabilities for defending against UAVs, identify the capability gaps, generate alternative 
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architectures for UAVs defense, and use systems engineering techniques to determine the 
most effective and cost-effective options for defending against the threat of UAVs. 
1. Analyze USN Destroyer Baseline  
Understanding the USN destroyer baseline for shipboard protection against UAV 
swarm attacks is the first objective. Information pertaining to USN destroyer shipboard 
protection system capabilities and system architecture is obtained from open sources and 
unclassified documents from stakeholders. The baseline is used to identify gaps and to 
compare with alternative options for USN destroyer protection against UAVs swarm at-
tacks. 
2. USN Destroyer Gaps Identification 
Identifying capability gaps is the second objective. Modeling and simulation is 
used to analyze the performance of USN destroyer baseline capabilities against UAV 
swarm attacks in accordance with the user’s operational environment.  
3. Identification of Alternatives  
Generating alternative systems for protecting USN destroyers from UAV swarm 
attacks is the third objective. Based on the available current system baseline and the re-
sult from the capability gaps identification, the systems engineering process is used to 
develop alternative systems for the DDG in defense against UAV swarm attacks. Data 
from system modeling and simulation is used to compare the performance of the pro-
posed architectures to the current baseline. The proposed alternatives and the results from 
modeling and simulation are presented to stakeholders for system development candidate 
selection. 
 
D. PROJECT TEAM 
The project team, referred to as Team Crane, consists of eight members enrolled 
in the Naval Postgraduate School Masters of Science degree for Systems Engineering. 
The project team consists of six integrated product teams (IPTs), along with a project 
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lead, deputy project lead, and configuration manager. The six IPTs include the Stake-
holder Advocate Team, Need Analysis and Research Team, Systems Architecture Team, 
Modeling and Design Team, Analysis Team, and Deliverable Review Team. An IPT 
structure was chosen in order to maintain tasking flexibility and to promote teamwork. 
Not all of the IPTs were in existence throughout the duration of the project. The IPTs 
were created when the need arose and members of the IPTs gradually joined other IPTs, 
as various tasks were completed. Therefore, flexibility was maintained by increasing or 
decreasing the number of members on each team, in order to meet the scheduled deliver-
ables outlined in the Integrated Master Schedule (IMS). However, in order to accommo-
date for an iterative process throughout the project, at least one team member was re-
sponsible for maintaining and updating previous deliverables of all IPTs. Because team 
members were a part of a small team throughout the duration of the project, effective 
communication and relationships were established, thus promoting teamwork. For more 
details see Appendix A. 
 
E. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DESIGN PROCESS 
1. Background 
In order to accomplish the study of this problem, Team Crane applied a Systems 
Engineering process adopted from a process developed by Blanchard and Fabrycky 
(2006). In coming up with a solution for the proposed topic, “Protection System Alterna-
tives for Destroyers against UAV Swarm Attack,” Team Crane used a conceptual design 
process. During the conceptual design, the team first identified the primary stakeholders. 
Next, the team generated a problem statement identified by the stakeholders, and through 
iterative correspondence between the team and the relevant stakeholders, transformed it 
into an effective need. The effective need statement provided Team Crane with the ability 
to begin identifying the system’s operational requirements. By identifying the operational 
requirements, Team Crane was able to create a high-level operational concept, the rele-
vant operational nodes, and the mission tasks (OV-1, OV-2, and OV-5, respectively). Fi-
nally, from analysis of the effective need, OV-1, and OV-5, and modeling and simulation, 
Team Crane developed functional requirements, identified alternative solutions, and 
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compared the utility of possible solutions. The systems engineering process is illustrated 
in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 : Systems Engineering Design Process 
2. Problem Definition 
The problem statement was vital to be addressed at the beginning of the project as 
it set the direction of the project for the team. The first initiative to scope and bound the 
problem was by developing a problem statement that provided the team with a defined 
idea from the stakeholder requirements. The stakeholder requirements helped the team to 
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address the various design functions of the systems engineering design process that con-
sist of major inputs and outputs. In early development of the systems engineering design 
process, the team focused on defining the major inputs and outputs of the problem state-
ment. The inputs address the concerns and complaints by the stakeholders and the outputs 
define the Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) and desired constraints. 
3. Needs Analysis 
The Needs Analysis identifies and defines the objectives of the project. An effec-
tive need statement was developed from the stakeholders’ requirement needs. From a 
document provided by a stakeholder, the following statement provides the team with a 
primitive user need statement: “Point defense capability to defend against limited air 
threats that penetrate Sea Shield local air defense umbrellas. The threat includes light ci-
vilian (general aviation) aircraft, small commercial aircraft and small radar cross-section 
targets such as UAVs” (N857 2007). 
From this statement, the team focused on the stakeholders’ interest in defending a 
destroyer from a particular threat in this scenario. Based on stakeholder guidance, the 
team analyzed the threat scenario of small UAVs making suicide attacks against a de-
stroyer. 
These scenarios do not have a defined environment in which the threat could po-
tentially have a major impact. Because of this, the team engaged the stakeholders in order 
to determine the optimal scenario.  
The scope of the project concentrates on the stakeholders’ desires to enhance their 
air defense capabilities against UAVs. The scope allowed the team to identify the needs 
of the stakeholder, the objectives for the system, and the criteria based on the threat. The-
se functions of the system level design process follow the scope and effective need state-
ment: 
• Develop Operational Concept 
o Description of how the system will be utilized 
o Mission requirements and MOEs 
• Define System Boundary 
o External system boundaries generated from operational concept baseline 
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o Input-output model 
• Develop System Objectives 
o Operational concept inputs 
o System level hierarchy of objectives 
4. Gap Analysis  
Once the requirements were fully understood from the stakeholders, a design ref-
erence mission (DRM) was established. The DRM defines the specific projected threat 
and operating environment baseline for the destroyer, which may range from a single 
mission platform to a multi-mission system platform. Important to note is that the DRM 
defines the problem, not a solution, by characterizing the complete operating environ-
ment to the baseline of this project.  
The DRM was developed based on the understanding of the user’s operational 
concept that was derived from the stakeholder needs. Based on these requirements, a 
simulated environment was developed that best suits the DRM. The operational environ-
ment is the environment in which the destroyer has to operate and defend itself from 
UAV swarms, and this project focuses on the environment where the destroyer is near the 
shore. In any mission-executable environment, the project team was able to exercise the 
destroyers’ capabilities. Given the DRM for this project, a feasibility analysis was con-
ducted to determine different approaches for defending against UAV swarm attack.  
The gap analysis identifies current capabilities for defending against a UAV at-
tack. It also identifies areas where current capabilities do not match the threat; these ca-
pabilities provide the input parameters for a model of the system. Modeling and simula-
tion was first used to establish the performance of the baseline destroyer against the UAV 
swarm threat, making use of current destroyer capabilities and planned upgrades over the 
next few years. 
5. Design and Analysis of Alternatives 
After understanding the problem definition and the user need, the project team 
conducted further research into identifying potential alternatives to the system. The team 
generated two or three alternative architectures to compare with each other and the base-
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line. Through the decomposition of architectures, the team evaluated the best system of 
alternatives through the various factors, such as modeling and simulation, life cycle cost, 
tradeoff-analysis, and risk analysis. These factors have an impact on the decision making 
phase that is part of the project plan. As alternatives were generated, they were evaluated 
to ensure they met stakeholder requirements, were conceptually viable, and had suffi-
ciently low risk. Different types of tools were used to assist in this evaluation. 
Modeling and simulation generates detailed data for the given scenario that is set 
based on the alternatives for improvements to the destroyer’s capabilities. The advantage 
of pursuing such a tool allowed the team to evaluate the effectiveness of an alternative 
concept, verify stakeholder’s needs are met, and suggest modifications for improving al-
ternatives.  
The life cycle cost estimation for each improvement alternative ties into the deci-
sion making process as it contributes to the analysis of alternatives. These estimates take 
into consideration the developmental design and integration, production, operational use, 
refinement, and disposal of the system.  
The trade-off and risk analysis ranks the improvement alternatives, taking into ac-
count life cycle cost, technical risk, and ability to successfully defend the destroyer 
against the threat swarm in accordance with the stakeholder requirements. These factors 
were used to determine the feasibility of identified alternatives. 
The decision making criteria of this phase feeds from the results of alternatives to 
the system. In order to evaluate the alternatives equally, the team focused on cost benefit 
analysis, value modeling, and decision matrices. The conclusion of these analyses ulti-
mately recommends the best suitable alternative for the stakeholders’ interest.  
6.  Modeling and Simulation  
In an effort to maximize the level of accuracy in the project, a wide variety of 
tools were employed to meet the user’s needs and stakeholders’ requirements. Project 
planning and the development of solutions based on stakeholders’ requirements involve a 
high level of organization. The following tools provide the necessary support to organize 




• CORE 8 is a comprehensive modeling environment used for complex systems 
engineering problems. It is used for integrated requirements management to en-
sure that stakeholders’ needs are being taken into consideration. This software al-
lows the generation of a variety of integrated graphical views: hierarchies, func-
tional flow, enhanced functional flows, N2, IDEF0, and physical block (Vitech 
n.d.). 
• Elluminate is a web conferencing program frequently used by educational enti-
ties and business to hold meetings and provide training. Students and instructors 
do not reside in the same geographical location; Elluminate sections between stu-
dents and professors are generally conducted on a weekly basis. This tool allows 
students to stay in contact with the instructors. Constant communication provides 
the necessary level of support to deliver effective solutions to stakeholders’ needs. 
• Sakai is the Naval Postgraduate School student webpage. Documentation gener-
ated by group members can be saved on the webpage. It provides another com-
munication channel to share ideas and files. 
• Microsoft Office Suite is a compilation of desktop programs that run on the Mi-
crosoft Windows or the Mac OS X operating system. The programs are designed 
to fulfill specific needs like creating or editing Word documents, spreadsheets, 
presentations, and meeting requests.  
o Microsoft Word is word processor that is used to create and edit docu-
ments. 
o Microsoft Excel is a dynamic spreadsheet that is used to model operation-
al scenarios for Navy ships and to perform other statistical and mathematical cal-
culations. Excel is used to model the performance of the DDG against UAV 
swarms, and produces a high enough fidelity model for the desired outputs. Monte 
Carlo analysis is used to simulate the range of probable outcomes. 
o Microsoft Project is a management tool that is used track group mem-
bers’ tasks, schedules, and roles. 
7. Process Outputs 
The capstone project team provided the following outputs: 
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• A project report containing: 
o A summary of the systems engineering tools and methods used 
o Analysis of alternatives, including models and simulations 
o Preferred system concept 
o Recommendations/conclusions for follow-on system development 
• A final presentation 
The analysis results in several products. First, it identifies how effective various 
potential improvements to a destroyer’s systems are at combating the threat UAVs. At 
minimum, this involves comparing the relative effectiveness of making destroyer im-
provements, allowing the stakeholders to determine which improvements provide the 
most benefit. 
Second, the analysis identifies which combination of improvements defeats the 
threat UAVs. Whereas the first analysis product identifies the effectiveness of single im-
provements, the second involves combinations because single improvements may not be 
enough to defend against the threat. 
The third analysis product is the result of adding in cost information. The costs of 
each potential improvement and combination of improvements were estimated. This in-
formation allowed the team to rank the improvements by cost and effectiveness, display-
ing to the stakeholders the most cost-efficient ways to make destroyer improvements 
against the UAV threat, and how much effectiveness is gained through the application of 
given funding. 
F. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
The stakeholders identified below constitute the initial list; the team used the ini-
tial stakeholders as starting points in the search for additional parties with a possible in-





The capstone project advisors were responsible for guiding the students who were 
team members of the capstone project. They were also responsible for attending Team 
Crane team meetings and providing feedback on the capstone project. 
2. Shipboard Electronic Warfare  
The NSWC Crane shipboard Electronic Warfare Chief Engineer is the point of 
contact for the project technical information of Electronic Warfare (EW) shipboard pro-
tection system. The EW Chief Engineer is the key stakeholder for EW shipboard protec-
tion system capabilities and gaps. The EW Chief Engineer provided information on cur-
rent capabilities to Team Crane during the capabilities analysis for gaps identification as 
well as information pertaining to potential EW solutions. 
3. Anti–Terrorism / Force Protection (AT/FP)  
The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) AT/FP Technical Warrant Holder 
is the primary stakeholder for the project technical information of non-EW shipboard pro-
tection systems. The NAVSEA AT/FP Technical Warrant Holder is the key stakeholder 
for non-EW shipboard protection systems capabilities and gaps. The NAVSEA AT/FP 
Technical Warrant Holder provided the information of current capabilities to Team Crane 
during the capabilities analysis for gaps identification as well as the project scope and 
scenarios. 
4. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)  
Engineers at NSWC Crane have performed research in UAVs and autonomous 
systems, and are the primary stakeholders for the technical information on UAVs. They 
provided the information related to UAV capabilities for the project scenarios and capa-




The user is the United States Navy. The U.S. Navy is the primary stakeholder for 
the capstone project. The U.S Navy provides required capabilities and system require-
ments. The U.S. Navy has a potential interest in the requirements and analysis produced 




II. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Conversations with the stakeholders, in conjunction with additional research, 
were used to identify realistic mission scenarios in which a DDG may find itself being 
attacked by a swarm of UAV without the support of additional ships. 
 
A. THREAT ANALYSIS 
1. Design Reference Missions 
The DDG operating scenario analyzed in this project consists of a near shore litto-
ral combat region with a significant amount of other activities in the environment. The 
environmental activities include the daily activities that one would notice from a typical 
day to day observation. Such activities would account for the DDG operating within a 
close distance of residential locations, populated areas of fishing boats, outdoor markets, 
and other civilian locations. 
A swarm of UAVs consisting of 5 to 10 vehicles will aim to come at the DDG 
from all directions. The UAVs will be launched at the DDG when the enemies are in po-
sition and can coordinate the timing of their individual launches, and when the DDG 
comes within sight of the enemy spotters. The DDG will be spotted by the enemy using 
binoculars from a mountaintop observation point near shore. Visibility is assumed to be 
good enough that binoculars can detect the DDG from at least a range of 24 km. At this 
point, the DDG will be at approximately 68 km from the port. It will take approximately 
3 hours for the DDG to reach the port travelling at 12 knots. The UAVs, each fitted with 
an explosive payload, will be launched with a mission to fly into the DDG as a suicidal 
attack. The destroyer’s plan of action to defeat a swarm of UAVs will follow the func-
tional flow that lays out the main top level functions to attempt to eliminate the threat 
(Detect, Prioritize, Track, and Engage). Figure 2 shows the positions of each launch area, 




Figure 2: DRM - Positions prior to attack. The DDG is en route to a port call. 
 
The two types of threats against the DDG are RC controlled UAVs and UAVs 
with similar capabilities to the Harpy. The Harpy is an autonomous UAV that produces a 
small Radar Cross Section (RCS) and will be equipped with an explosive warhead for a 
suicidal attack. The Harpy is a pre-programmed UAV that follows a loitering pattern until 
it detects radar signals from the communication systems of a destroyer. The Harpy is 
launched from a ground-based battery comprised of three launching units which are 1) a 
vehicle ground control shelter, 2) a support vehicle, and 3) an electric power unit. These 
vehicles can be positioned in a populated area for a quick and easy launch location. There 
are four Harpies in the scenario. The Harpy launch area will be located near the bay. The 
Harpy has at least a 3 km detection range (X8R 2.4Ghz 8ch Receiver n.d.). It travels at 
250 km/h. (Jane's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets 2011). It will launch 1.5 hours 
after the DDG is spotted. The RC UAV has a small RCS and will be equipped with ex-
plosive warheads. The RC UAVs are cost effective weapons that can be constructed 
through commercial off the shelf (COTS) parts. Despite their minimal operational range, 
these threats are envisioned to be launched from a shore that the DDG may be cruising 
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past and where an enemy could blend into the public. Also, the attack in this scenario 
happens during the day with good visibility and weather conditions.  
The RC UAVs are launched from the shore as depicted in Figure 2, and their re-
mote control range is at least 3 km (X8R 2.4Ghz 8ch Receiver n.d.). Also, RC UAVs fly 
low to the water’s surface. The fishing boat is located 6 km from the RC UAV launch 
pad. Once the RC UAVs go out of range from the controllers located at the launch pad, 
people on the fishing boat will control the RC UAVs. The RC UAVs will launch about 2 
hours after the DDG is spotted initially, or when the DDG is spotted from the RC UAV 
launch pad. The RC UAVs travel 250 km/h (Goolsbee n.d.). Harpies would hover up to 2 
hours around the attack area. At this point, the DDG is about 20 km away from the port. 
Figure 3 shows the simultaneous UAV attack when the DDG is closer to the foreign port. 
Since the RC UAV attack range is 3 km, the fishing boat is located 6 km from the RC 
UAV launch area, as shown in Figure 3. The fishing boat could be anywhere within 6 km 
of the RC UAV launch location, so the possible region of attack for the RC UAVs occu-
pies 6–9 km of the DDG’s intended route. Harpies and RC UAVs will attack the DDG at 
the same time, with the Harpies attacking from the Northeast and RC UAVs attacking 
from the Southeast. Both Harpies and RC UAVs are assumed to be equally difficult to 
shoot down because of their speed and RCS. Both would cause the same amount of dam-





Figure 3: DRM - Simultaneous UAV Attack 
 
B. AEGIS DDG DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES 
The current design of the DDG 51 Flight IIA is centered on the AWS. As previ-
ously stated, the Aegis Weapon System was primarily designed to counter targets flying 
at fast speeds with large radar cross sections. A swarm of UAVs, as defined in the previ-
ous section, flies at significantly slower speeds and has significantly smaller radar cross 
sections, compared to the targets the AWS was designed to counter. This section explores 
the current capabilities and limitations of the DDG with regard to countering a swarm of 





Figure 4: AWS for DDG 51 Flight IIA Block Diagram (From “Aegis Weapon Sys-
tem; DANCS; COMBATSS 21,” IHS Jane’s 2012) 
 
Four of the main components of the AWS, as seen in Figure 4, are the Aegis 
Command and Decision System (C&D), the Aegis Display System (ADS), the Aegis 
Weapon Control System (WCS), and the AN/SPY-1 radar system. The C&D acts as an 
integrator for all of the combat systems and is responsible for the command, control, and 
coordination of the AWS (“Aegis Weapon System; DANCS; COMBATSS 21,” IHS 
Jane’s 2012). The C&D acquires and processes the data from the SPY-1 radar and other 
detection systems as depicted in Figure 4, and relays the tactical information to the ADS 
and the WCS. The ADS provides the necessary displays and controls for human coordi-
nation of the AWS. It is from the ADS that a complete tactical picture is displayed and 
strategic commands are issued. Upon receiving an engagement order from the C&D, the 
WCS assigns a weapon system to the target and conducts the engagement using tracking 
data provided from the SPY-1 radar system (“The AEGIS Weapon System,” Threston 
2009). As depicted in Figure 4, the weapon systems under control of the WCS include the 
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Missile Fire Control System, Vertical Launching System, Seahawk System, and the Phal-
anx Weapon System. 
The majority of the AWS detection systems are found on the left-hand side of 
Figure 4, with the exception of the SPY-1 radar system, and the AWS engagement sys-
tems are found on the right-hand side of Figure 4. The remaining systems, such as Link 
11, are outside the scope of this report. The remainder of this section will discuss the de-
tection and engagement systems in greater detail and if they are applicable to countering 
a swarm of UAVs. 
1. Detection Systems 
a.   AN/SPY-1D(V) 
The AN/SPY-1D(V) radar system was first implemented on DDG 91 (“Arleigh 
Burke (Flight IIA) class,” IHS Jane’s 2012). The radar consists of four phased array an-
tennas that provide the AWS with 360 degree detection and tracking capabilities (“The 
AEGIS Weapon System,” Threston 2009). The radar was designed primarily as a surface 
and air radar capable of simultaneously tracking over one hundred targets (“AN/SPY-1 
Radar,” Global Security 2012). The capabilities upgraded specifically in the AN/SPY-
1D(V), over previous variants of the SPY-1 radar, improved the radar’s ability to detect 
low-flying targets with small radar cross sections (RCS) and operate in heavily cluttered 
environments (“AN/SPY-1 Radar,” Global Security 2012). Previous variants were lim-
ited to only searching above the terrain in littoral settings, in order to prevent having a 
high false alarm rate due to land clutter (“AN/SPY-1 Radar,” Global Security 2012). Alt-
hough this issue was addressed in the AN/SPY-1D(V) design, it is not confirmed to what 
extent the limitations were reduced. Therefore, this report assumes that the AN/SPY-
1D(V) can detect UAVs but may have trouble with low flying targets.  
b.   Seahawk System: LAMPS Mark III 
The LAMPS Mark III is an airborne platform designed for Anti-Surface Warfare 
(ASUW), and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) (“Sikorsky SH-60B Seahawk (LAMPS 
Mk III),” IHS Jane’s 2012). Due to the fact that LAMPS Mark III was not specifically 
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design to counter airborne threats, this system would not be effective in countering a 
swarm of UAVs. 
c.   Radar System: AN/SPS-67 
The AN/SPS-67 radar is a solid-state surface search radar that can also be used to 
assist in navigation. The AN/SPS-67 radar provides accurate detection and tracking for 
low-flying targets in a rainy and sea cluttered environment. AN/SPS-67 assists in naviga-
tion due to its ability to detect buoys and small obstructions (“AN/SPS-67,” Global Secu-
rity 2012), and would assist the ship in detecting a swarm of UAVs.  
d.   Identification Systems 
The DDG has the AN/UPX-29 identification system (“Arleigh Burke (Flight IIA) 
class,” IHS Jane’s 2012). In order to perform the identification of friend or foe function, 
the AN/UPX-29 interrogates unidentified targets using an electronic signal (“AN/UPX-
29(V) Interrogator System,” Global Security 2012). It is assumed that AN/UPX-29 does 
not provide information relative to the identification of a swarm of UAVs. Therefore, the 
UAV identification function is included in the overall ability of the DDG to properly de-
tect and track the air targets. 
e.   Electronic Sensing System (ESS) 
The ESS provides electronic detection data to both the C&D and the Electronic 
Warfare System (EWS). One implementation of an ESS is the AN/SLQ-32 system 
(“AN/SLQ-32(V) and Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP),” IHS 
Jane’s 2011). The AN/SLQ-32 system is responsible for the detection, analysis, and 
jamming of electronic threats operating in a wide range of frequencies (“AN/SLQ-32(V) 
and Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP),” IHS Jane’s 2011). Ear-
lier variants were limited to detection and analysis, while jamming capabilities were in-
corporated into the (V)3 and (V)5 variants (“AN/SLQ-32(V) and SEWIP,” IHS Jane’s 
2011). The AN/SLQ-32(V)3 is the variant on the DDG (“Arleigh Burke (Flight IIA) 
class,” IHS Jane’s 2012). Although the capabilities of being able to detect, analyze, and 
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jam incoming electronic threats are applicable to a swarm of UAVs, AN/SLQ-32 was not 
designed to counter such a threat. The AN/SLQ-32 system was designed to protect the 
ship from Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) (“AN/SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare (EW) 
system,” Federation of American Scientists 2012). Therefore, the AN/SLQ-32 system 
would not provide Electronic Sensing System (ESS) capabilities for a UAV threat, as de-
fined in the DRM, without a significant modification to the system or suffering a reduc-
tion in the system’s current capabilities. 
f.   Navigation System 
While the navigation radar may assist in the detection of targets, its additional in-
formation provided would be superseded by the information gathered from the AN/SPS-
67 and AN/SPY-1. It is assumed that in comparison with the AN/SPS-67 and the 
AN/SPY-1, the navigation radar is significantly less proficient at detecting and tracking 
targets.  
g.   Sonar Systems 
The UAVs outlined in the DRM do not have any underwater capabilities. There-
fore, sonar systems are not incorporated in the analysis of this report. 
h.   EO/IR and FLIR 
The Mk 46 and MK 20 are electro-optic surveillance systems that utilize the same 
visual and IR sensors (“Mk 20 Electro-Optical Sensor System (EOSS),” IHS Janes 2012). 
These systems are used to assist the Mk 34 GWS (5” gun) in target detection (“Mk 20 
Electro-Optical Sensor System (EOSS),” IHS Janes 2012). Although the (5” gun) is not 
considered to be applicable in the engagement of the UAV swarm, it is not unreasonable 
to assume that the Mk 46 and Mk 20 sensors could be used to assist other engagement 
systems. If it is determined that the improvement of detection systems will assist in the 
DDG in defending against a swarm of UAVs, then the Mk 46 and Mk 20 systems will be 
taken into consideration. Other electro optic and infrared sensors include the MK 48 Top-
lite and the Phalanx Thermal Imager. The Toplite Fire Control System assists the Mk 38 
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small arms mounts in target detection (BAE Systems 2011). The Phalanx Thermal Im-
ager assists the Close-In Weapons System (CIWS) in target detection (“MK 15 Phalanx 
Close-In Weapons System (CIWS),” Global Security 2012). It will be assumed that de-
tection capabilities of the Toplite Fire Control System and the Phalanx Thermal Imager 
will be included in the overall detection capability for these systems. 
2. Engagement Systems 
a.   Electronic Warfare System (EWS) 
The EWS is a collection of systems used to counter electronic threats. The EWS 
uses detection, tracking, and analysis data relayed from the ESS as depicted in Figure 4. 
The DDG systems with electronic warfare capabilities include the AN/SLQ-32(V)3, Mk 
36 Decoy Launch System (DLS), and Mk 53 – a variant of the Mk 36 DLS.  
As stated previously, the AN/SLQ-32(V)3 is capable of actively jamming an elec-
tronic threat (“AN/SLQ-32(V) and Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program 
(SEWIP),” IHS Jane’s 2011). However, it is assumed that because the AN/SLQ-32(V)3 
was designed to counter ASCMs and not UAVs, as defined in the DRM. Therefore, the 
AN/SLQ-32 system would not be able to provide jamming capabilities for the UAVs 
without a significant modification to the system or it suffering a reduction in the system’s 
current capabilities. 
The Mk 36 DLS launches infrared (IR) flares and chaff countermeasures. Due to 
the fact that the UAVs do not have infrared seeking capabilities, IR flares are not appli-
cable in deterring the UAVs. The purpose of using a chaff countermeasure is to reduce 
the effectiveness of enemy radar systems (Warren 1998). The UAVs, as defined in the 
DRM, do not have radar systems. Therefore, chaff is not effective in countering the UAV 
threat. 
The Mk 53 is a variant of the Mk 36 that launches the NULKA countermeasure 
which is a missile decoy designed to hover at a predetermined distance from the ship in 
an attempt to provide an incoming missile with a more attractive target (“Nulka Active 
Missile Decoy System,” IHS Jane’s 2012). The NULKA provides a more attractive target 
by making itself appear to have a similar radar cross section to that of the ship (“MK-53 
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Nulka Decoy Launching System (DLS),” Federation of American Scientists 2012). Be-
cause the Harpy UAVs are guided by radar signatures and the RC UAVs are manually 
guided, it is believed that neither of these UAVs will be misguided by the NULKA. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the NULKA countermeasure will not be applicable in coun-
tering the swarm of UAVs. 
b.   Gun Fire Control System 
The Gun Fire Control System, Mk 34, is a part of the MK 45 gun mount (“MK 34 
Gun Weapon System (GWS),” Global Security 2012). The Mk 45 is a 5”/62 caliber gun 
mount implemented on the DDG platform, starting with DDG 81 (“Arleigh Burke (Flight 
IIA) class,” IHS Jane’s 2012). A 54 caliber version of the Mk 45 is on DDG 79 and DDG 
80 (“Arleigh Burke (Flight IIA) class,” IHS Jane’s 2012). It is assumed that the minimum 
distance for the Mk 45 is beyond the distance from which the swarm of UAVs will be 
detected. Furthermore, because of the ship’s proximity to civilians, the firing of the Mk 
45 would put the civilians in danger. It is for these reasons that the Gun Fire Control Sys-
tem is not analyzed as a counter to the UAV threats. 
c.   Missile Fire Control Systems 
Systems related to the firing of anti-air missiles such as the SM-2 and SM-3 are 
not analyzed as counters to the UAV threats. These systems, depicted in Figure 4, include 
the Missile Fire Control System and the Vertical Launch System. It is assumed that the 
minimum engagement distance for the SM-2 and SM-3 missiles is beyond the distance at 
which the UAVs outlined in the DRM are detected. Other reasons not to use a missile to 
counter a UAV include the following. The firing of these missiles would endanger the 
nearby civilians and deplete the number of missiles left to defend against larger and more 
significant threats. Furthermore, the use of the missiles to counter the UAV threat would 




d.   Phalanx Weapon System 
There are two Phalanx Weapon Systems, also known as the CIWS located on the 
DDG (“Arleigh Burke (Flight IIA) class,” IHS Jane’s 2012). The CIWS is a fast firing 20 
mm gun assembly with its own fire-control radar (“Mk 15 Close-In Weapon System, 
Phalanx,” IHS Jane’s 2012). The system has multiple modes of operation that allow it to 
act as a standalone system or have a target assigned by the WCS (“The AEGIS Combat 
System,” Threston 2009). The CIWS has its own detection and tracking capabilities (“Mk 
15 Close-In Weapon System, Phalanx,” IHS Jane’s 2012). However, because the CIWS 
is able to accept a target assignment from the WCS, it can accept some form of detection 
and tracking data provided by the SPY-1 and other detection systems. When engaging a 
target, the CIWS is capable of firing at about 4,500 rounds per minute and is most effec-
tive at 1.47 km (“Mk 15 Close-In Weapon System, Phalanx,” IHS Jane’s 2012). The 
CIWS was originally designed as a counter to anti-ship missiles, but due to its short-
range firing capabilities, the CIWS would also be effective at countering the UAV threat. 
It is assumed that the effective range of the CIWS, 1.47 km, was determined for the pri-
mary threat, anti-ship missiles. Due to the fact that UAVs are much smaller than anti-ship 
missiles, the effective range for engaging UAVs is reduced in the model. 
e.   Underwater Fire Control System 
The UAVs outlined in the DRM do not have any underwater capabilities. There-
fore, Underwater Fire Control Systems are not incorporated in the analysis of this report. 
f.   Small Arms 
Although not depicted in Figure 4, the baseline weapon systems on the DDG in-
clude four M2HB .50 machine guns and two MK-38 MOD2 machine gun systems 
(MGS). They are mounted on each side of the DDG.  
 The MK-38 MOD2 MGS is the upgraded MK-38 with a remote operation console 
located inside the DDG’s protected structure for crew safety during combat. The MK-38 
MOD2 includes a fire control system with a forward looking infrared camera and an eye-
safe laser range finder, providing target tracking and improved accuracy. The MK-38 
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MOD2 uses 25mm ammunition with a firing rate of 180 rounds per minute (rpm) and an 
effective range of up to 2.5Km against aerial and surface targets larger than the UAVs 
described in the DRM (BAE Systems 2011). The M2HB 0.50 caliber machine gun was 
introduced in 1938. It has been widely used on several platforms, including the DDG. It 
is a crew operated machine gun with 0.50 caliber browning (12.7 x 99 mm) ammunition 
and a firing rate of 40 rpm with an effective range of up to 1.8 Km against aerial and sur-
face targets larger than UAVs (Cooke, Gary' U.S Infantry Weapon Reference Guide 
2010).  
 
C. GAP ANALYSIS 
As defined in the DRM, the threat being analyzed in this report is a swarm of 
UAVs in a littoral operating environment attacking a single DDG. It is understood that a 
DDG is responsible for operating in various other operational environments and defend-
ing against many more threats outside of the scope of this report. Therefore, in order to 
ensure that the performance of the DDG is not degraded in other operational environ-
ments, it is assumed that the current capabilities of the DDG are unable to be reduced. In 
the section titled “AEGIS DDG Defensive Capabilities,” a high-level overview of the el-
ements in the AWS as implemented on a DDG was given. In this section a qualitative 
analysis is conducted to determine if there are any limitations of the current systems in 
the AWS to defend against a swarm of UAVs. 
1. Functional Analysis 
In order for a DDG to defend against a swarm of UAVs, the functions depicted in 
Figure 5 need to take place. These functions were identified using a systems engineering 
approach. The articles titled “The AEGIS Weapon System” and “The AEGIS Combat 
System,” (found in the Naval Engineers Journal (121:3)) were used to determine the 
functions currently performed by the DDG in order to defend against the threats the DDG 
was originally designed to counter. These functions were then used to assist in the identi-
fication of the functions needed to defend against a swarm of UAVs. The resulting func-




Figure 5: Functional Hierarchy – Defend DDG from Swarm of UAVs 
 
The functions seen in Figure 5, were intentionally identified independent of any 
specific system implementation. 
a.   Detect Target 
As seen in Figure 5, the functions included in the detection of the target are 
searching for air targets, tracking the targets, eliminating clutter, and identifying if the 
target is a friend or foe. Searching for targets is referring to the act of physically or elec-
tronically searching the air space for targets. Once an air target is detected, the system 
begins to track the movement of the target. The system then uses the target’s movement 
characteristics to determine what type of target has been detected. It is assumed that the 
system has a varying degree of responses, depending on the type of target. For example, 
the system responds differently to an incoming missile approaching at a high speed than 
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an incoming UAV approaching at a low speed. In addition, it is envisioned that this func-
tion would eliminate any background clutter. Background clutter refers to the detection 
inputs from objects considered to be non-targets. For the purposes of this report, the func-
tion “Identify Type of Target” determines if the detected target is a UAV. Once it has 
been confirmed that the detected target is a UAV, the system then determines if the de-
tected UAV is a friend or foe, which ultimately determines if the detected UAV is hostile. 
For a more detailed diagram that identifies the inputs, outputs, and triggers for the func-
tions discussed in this section, see Figure C-38, located in Appendix C.  
b.   Control Target 
Once a hostile UAV has been detected, the system then controls the target by per-
forming the following functions, as seen in Figure 5: 1) determine the number of hostile 
targets, 2) prioritize hostile targets, 3) determine if the targets can be engaged, 4) sched-
ule the engagement, and 5) evaluate the engagement. The system starts the controlling 
threat process by first determining the number of hostile targets. Once the number of hos-
tile targets is determined, the targets are prioritized and assessed if they are able to be en-
gaged. Targets are not engaged if the act of engaging the targets would result in damage 
to non-hostile targets or if the targets are inside the minimum engagement distance for all 
of the engagement systems. The prioritization and determination of whether or not a tar-
get can be engaged are performed primarily using the target’s location data. The basic 
assumption is that all of the hostile UAV targets are able to provide an equal level of 
damage to the ship and that hostile UAV targets that are closer to the ship are given a 
higher priority. After the system has determined the priority of which hostile UAVs are to 
be engaged, and confirmed that the hostile UAVs are able to be engaged, the system pro-
vides an engagement order that triggers the scheduling of engagements. The scheduling 
of engagements assigns a target to a specific engagement system as well as the temporal 
opportunity of engagement, or the allotted time that the engagement system has to con-
duct the engagement. One purpose of determining the temporal opportunity of engage-
ment is to maximize the engagement capabilities by minimizing the duplication of effort. 
Knowing this information, targets can be more efficiently handed off to additional en-
gagement systems while minimizing the chance that the target would be simultaneously 
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engaged by multiple engagement systems. After the engagement has commenced, the 
success of the engagement is evaluated until the temporal opportunity for that engage-
ment system has expired. If the target is not successfully engaged, then the target is not 
destroyed. The system then includes the targets not destroyed in the total number of hos-
tile targets for reprioritization. It is assumed that tracking data is retained throughout the 
entire process. For a more detailed diagram that identifies the inputs, outputs, and triggers 
for the functions discussed in this section, see Figure C-34, located in Appendix C.  
c.   Counter Target 
The engagement of the hostile UAV is triggered by the engagement order. Once 
an engagement order has been received, the engagement systems wait for a target as-
signment and then conduct the engagement. As seen in Figure 5, the other aspect of coun-
tering the target is to minimize the chance that the target hits and or detonates near the 
DDG. This function refers to systems that do not need the tracking data in order to coun-
ter the target. For a more detailed diagram that identifies the inputs, outputs, and triggers 
for the functions discussed in this section, see Figure C-40, located in Appendix C. 
2. High Level System to Function Mapping 
In order to begin the assessment of the current AWS capabilities, an OV-2, as 
seen in Figure 6, was developed. The purpose of the OV-2 is to develop traceability from 
the needed functions to system elements. The systems shown in the OV-2 were intention-
ally identified independent of any specific system implementation. In the sections to fol-
low, the high level systems identified in the OV-2 will be used to categorize the existing 




Figure 6: OV-2 Defend DDG from Swarm of UAVs 
 
As seen in Figure 6, the Air Detection System is responsible for searching for air 
targets, tracking the targets, identifying the type of target, and identifying if the target is a 
friend or foe. The target identification is passed onto the Command and Decision System 
and the Deterrence Systems and the tracking data is passed onto the Command and Deci-
sion System and the Weapon Control System. 
The Command and Decision System is responsible for determining the number of 
hostile targets, prioritizing the targets, determining if the targets can be engaged, and cre-
ating a tactical picture of the DDG’s environment. The purpose of creating a tactical pic-
ture does not directly relate to the countering of UAVs, but assists in providing the ele-
ments necessary for human interaction. The Command and Decision System relays the 
tactical picture to the Display System, in order to be displayed. The operator interfaces 
with the Display System and provides the necessary commands which are relayed back to 
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the Command and Decision System. If included in those commands is an engagement 
order, the order is then relayed to the Weapon Control System. However, it may be the 
case that the system has been put into an automatic mode where the engagement orders 
are automatically generated. In this situation the engagement orders would be created 
from predetermined criteria, and not come directly from the operator. The operator would 
have to issue some form of a command to place the system in an automatic mode.  
The Weapon Control System schedules the engagements by using the target’s pri-
ority and distance from the ship, which is obtained from the tracking data. The result is a 
target assignment and temporal opportunity of engagement for a specific engagement 
system. In addition, the Weapon Control System relays the applicable tracking data re-
quired for engagement. The reason the tracking data is not relayed from the Air Detection 
System directly to the Engagement Systems is because this minimizes the number of re-
quired interfaces due to the multiple sources of tracking data. If the Air Detection Sys-
tems directly interfaced with the Engagement Systems, then there would be a need to in-
terface multiple sources of tracking data with multiple engagement systems. On the other 
hand, if the tracking data is relayed through the Weapon Control System, then there 
would be multiple sources of tracking data interfacing with potentially one Weapon Con-
trol System. In addition, there would be potentially only one interface from the Weapon 
Control System to a particular engagement system. Once the Weapon Control System 
receives feedback from the Engagement Systems that an engagement has been attempted, 
the Weapon Control System evaluates the Engagement and relays the targets not de-
stroyed to the Command and Decision System for reprioritization. 
The Deterrence Systems are responsible for minimizing the chance that a target 
will hit and or detonate near the ship. The target identification provided by the Air Detec-
tion System is used to determine when the deterrence systems are to be activated. For 
passive deterrence systems, this input may not be required. The deterrence systems do not 
need to interface with any additional systems beyond the air detection system because it 




3. AWS System Traceability 
This section will explore the AWS systems applicable to countering a swarm of 
UAVs as discussed in the section titled “AEGIS DDG Defensive Capabilities.” Table 1 
provides a mapping of the AWS systems to the systems shown in Figure 6. The AWS 
systems were only mapped to the high-level systems in Figure 6 if it was believed that the 
AWS system could perform the applicable functions. 
 















AN/SPY-1D(V) C&D Mk 2 ADS Mk 2 WCS Mk 8  MK-38 (x2) 
AN/SPS-67 
CIWS 
    M2HB (x4) 
     CIWS (x2) 
 
 
SLQ-32(V)3, as previously discussed, has electronic search and attack capabili-
ties. However, SLQ-32(V)3 is designed for incoming missiles. The system might not be 
robust enough to counter UAVs without significant modifications or a reduction in its 
current capabilities due to the small radar cross sections flying at slow speeds. Therefore, 
SLQ-32(V)3 is not depicted in Table 1.  
4. Capability Gaps 
From Table 1, it can be seen that the current AWS has at least one system able to 
perform the functions required for each of the high-level systems except for the Deter-
rence System. Although it can be argued that deterrence systems are not needed if the en-
gagement systems are capable of engaging all threats, adding deterrence systems may be 
an economical way to ensure the safety of the ship if the engagement systems were to be 
destroyed or overwhelmed. Therefore, deterrence systems should not be overlooked 
without some form of analysis, as they may provide another effective layer of defense. 
The sole reliance on engagement systems is seen as a capability gap that is investigated 
further in this report. 
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As seen in Table 1, the AWS has three primary sources of detection and tracking 
data: the AN/SPY-1D (V), AN/SPS-67, and CIWS systems. Although these systems are 
effective in the detection and tracking of air targets, the systems may not be robust 
enough to handle the detection and tracking of UAVs. This is due to the fact that the 
UAVs discussed in this report have small radar cross sections and fly at slow speeds. This 
report assumes that these detection systems are capable but not 100% effective at detect-
ing, tracking, and correctly identifying the incoming UAVs. The importance of having 
the capability to detect, track, and correctly identify incoming UAVs with a 100% effec-
tiveness is investigated further in this report.  
As seen in Table 1, the AWS primarily has three types of engagement systems for 
defending against a swarm of UAVs: two MK-38 small arms mounts, four M2HB small 
arms mounts, and two CIWS. It is unclear how effective these three types of systems 
would be at countering a swarm of UAVS. The effectiveness of these systems is investi-





















III. BASELINE MODELING AND SIMULATION 
From the Stakeholder Analysis discussion, the primary objective is to protect the 
DDG from attacks made by the swarm of UAVs. This section will investigate the current 
DDG’s ability to defend against a swarm of UAVs and determine alternative solutions. 
The effectiveness of the UAV attacks is represented by the number of hits the UAVs are 
able to inflict upon the DDG. This section starts by describing how the team modeled the 
applicable systems as identified in Table 1, in order to establish a baseline performance in 
defending against a swarm of UAVs. Once a baseline was established, a sensitivity anal-
ysis was performed to determine which variables have the most influence on the perfor-
mance of the DDG’s defensive capabilities.  
A. METHOD 
Modeling and simulation (M&S) facilitates analysis of a UAV swarm attack on a 
DDG. The choice of Microsoft Excel simulation allows for a quick and easy parameter 
value change for proposed calculations within the model. The Monte Carlo approach was 
the method chosen because it allows the model output to simulate and analyze the ran-
dom variables in the DRM (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). The two primary goals for 
the baseline model are to characterize the capabilities the baseline DDG brings to bear 
during an attack from a swarm of UAVs and to identify gaps that can potentially be miti-
gated through enhancements to the DDG.  
The baseline model reflects an operational environment based on the defined user 
need addressed in the DRM. The team analyzed and researched the current capabilities 
the DDG has to defend against a UAV swarm attack. The identified information estab-
lishes input placeholder values for the baseline model. In order to keep this baseline 
model UNCLASSIFIED, the remainders of the parameters are based on accessible un-
classified data and assumptions for the unknowns. The identified parameters are not a 




B. MODEL BLOCK DIAGRAM 
The baseline model consists of three layers of defenses capable of withstanding a 
UAV swarm attack. Each of the three layers in the baseline model includes opportunities 
for detection and opportunities for engagement by defensive weapon systems. With the 
given scenario, the number of UAVs in the swarm ranges from five to ten, with a baseline 
number of eight to be used for the model results. The ‘CRITBINOM’ is the primary func-
tion that is implemented in the model equation to return a cumulative binomial distribu-
tion. This function is executed by “returning the smallest value for which the cumulative 
binomial distribution is greater than or equal to a criterion value” (Microsoft Support 
2007). Inserting a random number into the function allows for a new calculation each 
time the function is called, resulting in different possible outcomes for each simulation 
run. The tables below describe the identified values for the model baseline.  
 
Table 2: Sensor Detection Parameters 
Sensor Detection Layer Effective Range (m) Probability of Detection 
Long 1000 .4 
Medium 500 .5 
Short 250 .6 
 
Table 3: CIWS Parameters 
CIWS Engagement Layer Effective Range (m) Probability of Kill Firing Cycles (s) 
Long 750 to 500 .2 1.25 
Medium 500 to 250 .3 1.25 
 
Table 4: Small Arms Parameters 
Small Arms Engagement Layer Effective Range (m) Probability of Kill Firing Cycles (s) 
Medium 500 to 250 .1 .6 







Table 5: UAV Parameters 
UAV Swarm Type UAV Speed (m/s) Probability of Hit 
Harpy  69.44 .9 
Radio Control (RC) 69.44 .9 
 
The baseline model has a sequence that flows from each of these three layers dur-
ing a UAV swarm attack. A fixed number of incoming UAVs has been set to four Harpy 
UAVs and four RC UAVs. In the baseline model, the incoming swarm UAV will enter 
the first layer of defenses. The long-range sensors have a chance to detect each member 
of the UAV swarm with the probability defined in Table 2. The leaked (undetected) 
UAVs are calculated from the initial amount of UAVs subtracted from the detected num-
ber of UAVs. The defensive weapons are assumed to spend a certain amount of time on 
each target. This “cycle time” includes the time required to acquire a target, fire at it, 
conduct battle damage assessment, and move to the next target (if necessary). For every 
cycle spent on a target, there is a probability of kill dependent on the range as defined in 
Table 3 and Table 4. The number of defeated UAVs also depends on the number of de-
tected UAVs; the defensive weapon systems cannot defeat more UAVs than have been 
detected so far. Table 6 follows an example swarm of UAVs through each layer of the 
baseline model.  











Long Range 8 3 8 – 3 = 5 CIWS 0 
Medium Range 8 2 5 – 2 = 3 CIWS, Small Arms 2 
Short Range 6 3 3 – 3 = 0 Small Arms 1 
Total 5 8 N/A N/A 3 
 
Eight inbound UAVs enter the long range layer where three UAVs are detected. 
Given that three have been detected, five are leaked through the long range layer. The 
defensive weapon systems did not defeat any UAV at the long range layer. At the medi-
um range layer, two UAVs have been detected out of the five that were leaked from the 
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long range layer. Given that two have been detected, three have been leaked through the 
medium range layer. The defensive weapon systems defeated two UAVs at the medium 
range layer. Finally, the short range layer detects three UAVs that were leaked from the 
medium range layer. Given that three have been detected, none were leaked. The defen-
sive weapon systems defeated one UAV at the short range layer. From Table 6, there are 
a total of three UAVs that have been defeated by the defensive weapon systems and five 
remaining UAVs which each have a probability of hitting the destroyer as defined in Ta-
ble 5. A model block diagram in Figure 7 shows the series of events in a UAV swarm 
attack. 
 
Figure 7: Model Block Diagram 
 
The primary sense of this model is to reiterate the sequence of events that were 
explained through the previous example, but in a descriptive block diagram. The diagram 
intentionally depicts each “Counter UAVs” at a given range closer to the bottom of the 
diagram than the “Counter UAVs” at the previous range. This symbolizes that with each 
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flow down and hit the destroyer unless they are completely destroyed through the coun-
ter-UAV tactics such as CIWS and small arms. The baseline model only makes use of the 
middle three ranges and times, but leaves room for proposed system alternatives to make 
use of additional ranges and times. 
C. BASELINE MODEL RESULTS  
The baseline model results have valuable information that can lead the team to 
explore for better enhancements. Figure 8 shows 500 simulation results for a swarm of 8 
UAVs attacking a DDG. The baseline DDG would experience a significant amount of 
UAV hits; the most likely outcome is for four UAVs to impact the ship.  
 
 
Figure 8: Baseline Model: 500 Simulation Runs with 8 Inbound UAVs 
 
Additional baseline model results in Figure 9 include the average number of 





Figure 9: Baseline Model Averages for 500 Simulation Runs with 8 Inbound UAVs 
 
D. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
With the model in place for the baseline DDG, a sensitivity analysis showed 
which types of improvements yielded the greatest effect on the model’s outcome. The 
sensitivity analysis involved varying several input parameters individually and comparing 
how each affected the number of hits scored by UAVs, so that system alternatives could 
focus on improving the most important parameters. 
1.  Method 
The sensitivity analysis included two levels of improvements to these parameters: 
small arms accuracy, CIWS accuracy, small arms cycle time, CIWS cycle time, and de-
tection accuracy. From the baseline model, the probability-based accuracy parameters 
increased by 0.1 and 0.2, while the time-based parameters decreased by 0.1 and 0.2 se-
conds. Improving one parameter at a time allowed the team to compare each simulation’s 
average number of hits scored on the DDG. 
Weapon system range did not play a part in the sensitivity analysis, because de-
creasing cycle time yields the same result. For a given accuracy, a weapon system can 
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shoot down a number of targets dependent on how much time the targets spend within 
range, and how much time the system spends on each target. So, decreasing the cycle 
time would have the same effect as increasing the range; the weapon system would have 
the opportunity to shoot down more targets. When the model shows improvement with 
cycle time decrease, the DDG improvements which correspond to the results would in-
clude improvements to weapon system range. 
The team also experimented with other changes to gain insight into the model be-
havior. This included changing the number of UAVs in the inbound swarm from eight 
down to five and up to ten. It also included improving the weapon system parameters 
with an accuracy increase of up to 0.5 and a cycle time decrease of up to 0.45 seconds. 
2.  Results/Discussion 
Improving sensor accuracy did not have much impact on the number of hits 
scored by the eight inbound UAVs as shown in Figure 10, whereas improving weapon 
system parameters, such as the CIWS accuracy in Figure 11, had more of an impact. 
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Figure 11: Model results for increase to CIWS accuracy 
 
Improvements to the CIWS accuracy and cycle time both reduced the number of 
hits, with comparable increases to accuracy (Figure 11) making more of a difference than 
decreases in cycle time (Figure 12).  
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Reducing the number of incoming UAVs to 5 allowed the DDG to withstand it 
more easily (Figure 13), while 10 UAVs easily overwhelmed the baseline DDG’s defens-
es (Figure 14). 
 
 
Figure 13: Baseline DDG with 5 inbound UAVs 
 
 




Successive improvements to the CIWS and small arms made diminishing returns 
on the number of hits reduced. With 10 incoming UAVs, Figure 15 shows a number of 
trials which increase accuracy by 0.1 above the previous trial, ranging from an improve-
ment above the baseline of 0.1 in Trial 1 to 0.5 above the baseline in Trial 5. Cycle time 
similarly decreased below the baseline from 0.09s in Trial 1 to a decrease of 0.45s in Tri-
al 5. These changes drastically altered each weapon system’s parameters; the CIWS at 
long range, for example, went from a baseline accuracy of 0.2 and cycle time of 0.5s to a 
Trial 5 accuracy of 0.7 and cycle time of 0.05s. This tenfold increase to the number of 
targets the CIWS can engage does not correspond to any potential DDG improvement, 
but rather helps to show interesting model behavior. 
 
 
Figure 15: Successive weapon system improvements 
 
Drastic weapon system improvements reduce the number of hits scored on the 
DDG, but only to a point, as shown by the right-hand graph in Figure 15. Whereas Trial 1 
reduces the average hits scored to 3.4 from a baseline of 5.4, and Trial 2 reduces them to 
2.0, Trial 5 only further reduces the hits to 1.3. Because sensors did not improve along 
with the weapon systems, some UAVs remain undetected until they impact the ship. 
The first four graphs of Figure 15 show how many UAVs are shot down by the 
two weapon systems at each range. As the CIWS parameters improve, at long range it 
improves from shooting down a baseline of 1.4 UAVs to 4.0 UAVs in Trial 3. Perfor-
mance does not improve beyond that because the CIWS has exhausted all available tar-


























proves at medium range, increasing from a baseline of 2.0 to 3.6 in Trial 2. After Trial 2, 
so many UAVs are shot down at long range that there are fewer available targets at medi-
um range, so even with continuing improvement, the CIWS shoots down fewer targets at 
medium range.  
A similar decrease in performance affects the improved small arms at medium 
range. The number of UAVs shot down increases from a baseline of 0.2 to 0.4 in Trial 1, 
but then decreases to 0.1 in Trial 2 and to 0 after that. The CIWS in Trial 3 and beyond is 
so effective that it leaves zero UAV targets available for the small arms at medium range. 
At short range, the small arms performance steadily increases from a baseline of 0.3 
UAVs shot down to 1.5 in Trial 5. Continuing to improve small arms does make a differ-
ence at short range, because there are some UAVs which evade detection until they reach 
short range. In Trial 3 and afterward, all targets detected at long or medium ranges are 
destroyed by the CIWS. When newly detected targets become available at short range, 
they are inside the CIWS minimum engagement range, leaving the small arms as the only 
engagement option. 
3.  Conclusions 
Improving the sensors is not as effective as making weapon system improve-
ments, and weapon systems would have to be improved a significant amount before the 
improvements’ effectiveness becomes limited due to the sensors. Therefore, the system 
alternatives focus on neutralizing, not detecting, UAVs. 
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IV. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
This section establishes the system requirements using capability gap analysis, 
baseline modeling and simulation, and stakeholder analysis. Requirements definition at 
the early stages of the systems engineering process is vital to develop system solutions 
capable of solving a particular problem, since requirements drive the quality, functionali-
ty and effectiveness of the system. Requirements provide tangible statements of needs 
that engineers can focus on meeting. Sharon Vannucci, based on several years of experi-
ence in the systems engineering field, defined system requirements as “characteristics 
that identify the accomplishment levels needed to achieve specific objectives under a giv-
en set of conditions.” Further, she says that requirements should define “what the system 
is supposed to do but not specify how the system is to perform” (Vannucci 2010). 
 
 
Figure 16: System Requirement identification sources 
 
Team Crane developed a requirement list based on three main sources as shown 
in Figure 16: (1) capability gap analysis, (2) modeling and simulation, and (3) stakehold-
ers. As described in the capability gap analysis section, several technical capabilities gaps 










• Lack of deterrence systems, in the case that the engagement systems are not capa-
ble of engaging all threats 
• Sole reliance on engagement systems 
• Limited detection and tracking capabilities in the detection of air targets with a 
small radar cross section area 
• Limited detection and tracking capabilities in the detection of air targets flying at 
lower speeds 
• Limited capability to identify UAVs 
• Limited electronic attack capability to defeat a UAV swarm attack 
Gaps in technical capabilities were translated into functional requirements (Ap-
pendix D – System Requirements), as a response to the deficiencies found in the studied 
areas. M&S was used to illustrate the DDG baseline capabilities to withstand an attack 
from a swarm of UAVs. M&S through Microsoft Excel allowed the exposure of the sys-
tem to a variety of possible operational scenarios in a short period of time without risking 
the system, enabling money and time to be saved. The baseline DDG model allowed the 
engineers to observe and gather technical data on the DDG’s effectiveness against differ-
ent scenarios and threats. After analyzing the findings of the capability gap section, Team 
Crane came up with a series of improvements to the DDG to close current and future 
gaps. In the late stages of M&S, the DDG baseline was modified and tested with different 
combinations of the proposed improvement alternatives to the DDG such as the EW ca-
pability and smokescreen alternatives.  
In the modeling and simulation section are listed the results of hundreds of runs of 
the baseline system, which revealed the DDG’s inability to defeat a UAV swarm attack. 
The baseline and modified baseline model results provided useful information which led 
to the requirements in Appendix D. 
Stakeholder input was vital to define some of the requirements that shaped the ar-
ranged set of solutions presented in the following sections. Stakeholder input was gath-
ered through meetings and other communication such as e-mail and telephone conversa-
tion. Requirements reflect stakeholders’ needs, which led to enhanced solutions, and ul-
timately a better system. 
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After developing the requirements for the DDG, requirements were linked to the 
system functions using CORE 8 from Vitech. CORE 8 is a comprehensive modeling en-
vironment built for complex systems engineering problems. It provides “a flexible way to 
visualize the interactions between requirements, functions, and components” (Vtech n.d.). 
Appendix D shows the functions linked to the requirements. CORE 8 provides clarity and 
allows the recipient to understand how requirements and system functions are connected. 
Several alternatives/systems solutions to the requirements needs are discussed in 
the following sections. During the risk assessment analysis, an evaluation of the effect of 
the proposed alternatives and the risk that it poses to the requirements was done. It pro-


























V. SYSTEM ALTERNATIVES 
With regards to the DDG’s baseline performance, the results of the sensitivity 
analysis established that the improvement of engagement systems was more effective 
than the improvement of detection systems. In this section, engagement alternatives are 
identified and assessed based on cost and risk.  
A. METHOD 
1.  Generation of Alternatives 
After performing the sensitivity analysis on the baseline model, the team brain-
stormed possible alternatives to decrease the number of UAV hits on the DDG. As previ-
ously discussed, detection alternatives were not taken into consideration. This is because 
it was concluded from the sensitivity analysis that increasing the engagement capabilities 
of the DDG had a much greater effect than increasing detection capabilities. Open discus-
sion generated many possible alternatives which the team then narrowed based on the 
sensitivity analysis results, and alternatives which only improve detection were excluded. 
The team selected all but the most infeasible remaining alternatives, and noted for each 
rough estimates of the applicable threat, model impact, and risk associated with imple-
mentation as described in Table 7.  
 
Table 7: Alternative Methods 
Alternatives Applicable Threat Model Impact Risk 
LAWS Harpy/RC Medium Low 
(EW) RC Jamming (360 degree coverage) RC High Medium 
UAV acting as Radar Decoy Harpy High Medium 
Fire Scout with Conventional Weapons Harpy (Possibly RC) Low Low 
Additional Small Arms Harpy/RC Low Low 
Ship Radar Decoy Harpy High Medium 
Reactive Armor Harpy/RC Medium Medium 
Fog/Smoke Screen RC Medium Medium 
Shrapnel-Chaff Harpy/RC Medium High 
Additional CIWS Harpy/RC Medium Low 
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The applicable threats were assigned for each of the ten alternatives. Some of the 
selected alternatives have the potential to engage both threats, which is superior to alter-
natives capable of engaging only one UAV type. The model impact was rated from low 
to high for each alternative based on the team’s estimate. For instance, the team believed 
that the electronic warfare (EW) option to jam RC UAVs would have a better impact in 
the model than adding additional small arms mounts. A rough estimate of risk is also as-
sociated with each alternative based on implementing the design on the DDG.  
2.  Method for Cost Estimation of Alternatives 
The cost estimation process for each alternative involves using a framework for 
total ownership cost analysis. All cost estimates for this project exclude the cost of infla-
tion; therefore, all final cost estimates are valued in the year of the budget material used 
as a reference. The cost estimation framework is established with five columns for tasks, 
reference cost, percentage of effort, duration of effort, and alternative cost estimate for 
each alternative as shown in Table 8. 










 Alternative Cost Estimate 
($M) ($M) 
System Development $ Value % Number of 
Years 
=$Value*%*Number of Years 
System Test and  
Evaluation 
$ Value % Number of 
Years 
=$Value*%*Number of Years 
System Management $ Value % Number of 
Years 
=$Value*%*Number of Years 
System Procurement $ Value % 5 =$Value*%*5 OR $Value*Qty 
System Sustainment $ Value % 12 =$Value*%*12 
Total = Sum of Estimation per task  
 
The first column contains the major tasks for a program from the start to the end 
of the life cycle. The major tasks are identified in the system engineering process as 1) 
system development, 2) system test and evaluation, 3) system management, 4) system 
procurement, and 5) system sustainment.  
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The second column is the reference cost. The reference cost estimates are associ-
ated with each major task. The reference cost estimates can be from the Navy budget for 
a similar Navy project, a similar work project, or a commercial off the shelf vendor. 
The third column is the percentage of effort for each task compared to the refer-
ence cost in Column Two. The percentage of effort for each task is weighted according to 
the results of the alternative work load analysis. The percentage of effort can be in be-
tween 0% and 100% or greater than 100%, in the case where the effort is more than the 
reference cost. 
The fourth column is the duration of effort for each task. The duration of effort is 
weighted according to the results from the work load analysis for each task. The duration 
of effort is assumed to be 12 years for the alternative life cycle after the system develop-
ment and test and evaluation tasks are completed. The duration for the system manage-
ment is the sum of duration of system development, system test and evaluation and 12 
year system life cycle. The duration for system procurement assumes that the procure-
ment funding allocation is equally distributed for the 5 year installation period.  
The fifth column is the alternative cost estimate for each task. The alternative cost 
estimate for each task is the product of Columns Two, Three and Four. The system pro-
curement cost estimate can also be estimated from the cost per system and quantity re-
quired; in this case, the 5-year duration does not contribute to the line item total. The total 
cost estimate of the alternative is the sum of the alternative cost estimates for each task. 
With the framework defined, the cost estimation process includes task identifica-
tion, work load assessment, cost estimation per task, and total alternative cost estimation 





Figure 17: Cost Estimation Process 
Task  
Identification 








a.  Alternatives Task Identification 
Tasks identification is the assessment of the required tasks to implement the alter-
natives. The alternative can be a newly designed system implementation. Or, the alterna-
tive can be just a modification of the existing systems or just an additional quantity of 
existing systems, such as extra small arms mounts or CIWS mounts. The tasks identifica-
tion is done according to the tasks categories as shown in Table 8 and in line with the 
Department of Defense (DoD) systems engineering process as shown in Figure 18. 
 
 
Figure 18: 2009 DoD Systems Engineering Process Model 
(From Defense Acquisition University) 
 
System development provides services derived from the analysis of users’ needs 
as well as the threat environment, to development of the system requirements, the design 
and the integration of the system hardware and software (which perform the desired func-
tions), and the system prototype development for test and evaluation. 
System test and evaluation includes developmental test and evaluation of the sys-
tem prototype and operational test and evaluation of the delivered systems.  
Program management provides the services such as resource allocation, personnel 
management, contracts oversight, risk management, technical interface management, 
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technical data management, and configuration management, which are identified in the 
DoD system engineering process shown in Figure 18. Program management also pro-
vides the government engineering services, subject matter experts, and travel costs such 
as per diem, transportation, and miscellaneous costs. 
System procurement includes the acquisition services to procure the systems as 
well as to allocate the funding to purchase the systems for the fleet, including shipping 
and handling services. System sustainment provides services to sustain the system during 
its life cycle, such as integrated logistics support, government engineering support, and 
system disposal/demilitarization. Integrated logistics support provides the services for the 
systems maintenance, the users’ training, the systems problem tracking, and all other lo-
gistics to sustain the systems. Government engineering support provides the technical 
services for system maintenance and the systems subject matter expertise to install the 
systems and to sustain the systems until the end of the life cycle. 
b.   Alternatives Work Load Assessment 
Work load assessment is the estimation of the required efforts and duration of the 
efforts for each task for the systems life cycle which are discussed in the task identifica-
tion section. The estimation is performed based on the work load relatively scaled in ref-
erence to the similar existing programs. The 0% end of the effort scale represents the es-
timation that no effort is needed in reference to the similar existing program, while 100% 
represents the estimation that the same amount of effort is needed in reference to the sim-
ilar existing program. However, the percentage of effort can be more than 100% if the 
magnitude of the effort for that task is greater than what is indicated in the reference cost. 
The duration of the cost estimation for the life cycle of the alternative systems is based on 
the magnitude of the alternative, with 5 years for most procurement and installation ef-
forts, and 12 years for sustainment. However, it cannot go beyond the DDG life cycle. 
c.  Alternatives Cost Estimation 
Cost estimation is the next step in the process. It is based on the reference cost 
and the results from the task identification and work load assessment. The cost estimation 
is calculated as the product of the reference cost, the percentage of effort, and the dura-
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tion of effort. The total alternative cost estimation is the sum of the costs from the indi-
vidual tasks. Table 9 is the cost estimation for the small arms mounts alternative as an 
example of how the cost estimation is achieved, and it is discussed in the section of this 
report titled “Small Arms Mounts Alternative.”  
 




Quantity  Percentage 












$0.00  1 100% 0 $0.00  
SYSTEM TEST &  
EVALUATION (Research, 
Development, Test and 
Evaluation, Navy 2012)  




Test and Evaluation, Navy 
2012) 
$1.20  1 60% 12 $8.64  
SYSTEM  
PROCUREMENT  
       $251.10  
MK 38 MOD2 Procurement 
(Weapons Procurement, 
Navy 2012) 
$1.13  124 100% 5 $139.62  
MK 38 MOD2 Installation 
(Weapons Procurement, 
Navy 2012) 
$0.56  124 100% 5 $69.94  
M2HB 50 Cal (Weapons 
Procurement, Navy 2012) 
$0.01  62 100% 5 $4.34  
CROWS II (Army Guide 
2008) 
$0.08  310 100% 5 $24.80  
M2HB 50 CROW II Installa-
tion (Estimation=50% cost of 
procurement cost) 
$0.04  310 100% 5 $12.40  
SYSTEM SUSTAINMENT 
(Operation and Maintenance, 
Navy 2012) 
$28.00  1 30% 12 $100.80  




3.  Method for Risk Assessment of Alternatives 
The team assessed risk for each individual alternative. The number of risks that 
need to be looked at for each alternative depended on what requirements applied to each 
specific alternative. Every alternative is designed to improve the DDG’s chances of de-
feating a suicidal UAV threat, so the requirements of that alternative must map to a spe-
cific risk. For each alternative, the team considered what obstacles could prevent that al-
ternative from being implemented on the DDG, as well as what could prevent it from per-
forming its full intended purpose successfully. The risk assessment process was adapted 
from the Navy’s Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition (Defense 2006). Risk was 
also assessed for the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) ((ASD(R&E)) 2011) of the al-
ternative. Table E-45 can be used to determine what the TRL is based on the descriptions. 
Finally, any suitability considerations such as human factors, logistics, and personnel re-
quirements that apply for a specific alternative were also taken into account as risk candi-
dates. 
For each alternative, a risk table was filled in for all of the risks that applied. Each 
risk was explained as to why it was a risk for that alternative. The risks were then mapped 
using the two tables. Table 10 was used to show the likelihood and severity of the risk 
and Table 11 was used to map the risks to the risk number. The order of the risks goes 
from highest risk to lowest risk, with 1 being the highest. The risks not associated with 
requirements, such as the TRL and suitability considerations, were also included in the 
tables. The risks are put into three categories: critical, moderate, and negligible. This 
gives an idea of how significant each risk is. Table 10 provides an example of how each 
of the tables was filled in. 











Severe    3 1 
High  7 5  2 
Medium  8 6 4  
Low 11 9    
Minimal/None 12 10    
Note: Red – Critical, Yellow – Moderate, Green – Negligible 




Table 11: Risk Mapping 
Risk Number Risk Significance  Risks 
1 Critical  Biggest Risk 
2 Critical  Risk 2 
3 Critical  Risk 3 
4 Moderate  Risk 4 
5 Moderate  Risk 5 
6 Moderate  Risk 6 
7 Moderate  Risk 7 
8 Negligible  Risk 8 
9 Negligible  Risk 9 
10 Negligible  Risk 10 
11 Negligible  Risk 11 
12 Negligible  Lowest Risk 
 
B. FIRE SCOUT WITH UAV RADAR DECOY 
Radar decoys launched from the DDG’s UAV could reduce the number of Harpy 
UAVs that target the DDG. The Generic Expendable (GEN-X) is a countermeasure de-
vice housed in a cartridge, and GEN-Xs are meant to be dispensed from aircraft. Such 
items are dispensed from aircraft countermeasure dispensers, and each cartridge can be 
used once. After launch, it emits a radar signals in the hopes of seducing incoming radar-
guided missiles. Raytheon completed this development of GEN-X in the late 1980s, and 
it has been in operation since then. GEN-X is 15 cm in length (17 cm length with fin ex-
tended), 36 cm in diameter, and weighs 0.45 kg with cartridge. Raytheon Network Cen-
tric Systems from McKinney, Texas is the contractor of GEN-X decoy (Jane's Radar And 




Figure 19: ALE-55, RT-1489 GEN-X (From Electronic Decoy 2011) 
 
The UAV radar decoy alternative would extend the capability to defend the DDG 
against UAV swarm attacks by launching the decoys with a dispenser such as the ALE-
47. The ALE-47 can integrate with an aircraft’s radar warning receivers, missile warning 
receivers and other electronic warfare sensors. The ALE-47 has the capability to launch 
radio frequency and infrared countermeasures automatically when the aircraft’s sensors 
detect a threat to defeat incoming missiles. The ALE is compatible with a variety of 
countermeasures, such as different types of flares and chaff, as well as is designed to 
work with advanced future countermeasures. The UAV radar decoy alternative would 
improve the DDG protection against UAV swarm attacks at long range, because the UAV 
could launch the decoys before the Harpy UAVs get too close to the DDG. The imple-
mentation of this alternative would decrease the number of UAV hits (ALE-47 2008). 
This alternative involves installing the ALE-47 on the Fire Scout, so that it can 
dispense GEN-X cartridges. The Fire Scout UAV would detect ahead of the DDG during 
the approach to port. When enemy UAVs are detected, the Fire Scout would move to in-
tercept and launch the GEN-X radar decoys. The enemy Harpy UAVs would detect the 
radar signature of the decoy and attack it instead of the DDG. The ALE-47 consists of the 
cockpit control unit, sequencer units, countermeasure dispensers and an optional pro-
grammer. The cockpit control unit normally provides an interface with the pilot in the 
cockpit, but because the Fire Scout is piloted remotely, it would have to be modified to be 
controlled by the Fire Scout operator on the DDG. The sequencer units control the dis-
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pensers, and are automatically capable of detecting misfires and correcting them. The se-
quencers are built in to the dispenser units on the rotary-wing version. Each dispenser can 
hold five different types of countermeasures, for a total of 30. The whole system can ac-
commodate up to 32 dispensers on fixed-wing aircraft and 16 on rotary-wing aircraft. Be-
cause the Fire Scout is smaller than other rotary-wing aircraft, this alternative assumes it 
would be appropriate to fit no more than 10 dispensers on this Fire Scout platform (ALE-
47 2008).  
 
Figure 20: ALE-47 Dispensers and associated equipment (From ALE-47 2010) 
 
There are risks associated with the implementation of the UAV radar decoy alter-
native. The ALE-47 has been developed, tested, integrated, and fielded. The team assess-
es the technology readiness of this alternative at TRL 6. The technology already exists, 
but has not been integrated into the Fire Scout yet. Table 13 lists the risks associated with 
UAV radar decoy implementation. It lists from most important to least important. Accu-
racy is important because the radar decoys must have a high probability of seducing the 
Harpy UAV threat. Range plays an important part as well, in that the decoys might not be 
successful if they cannot attract the Harpy UAVs from a large enough distance. Next is 
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availability, because dispensers from the decoy need to be available on time when in op-
eration.  
 





Low Likelihood Likely Highly 
Likely 
Near Certainty 
Severe      
High      
Medium   3 2 1 
Low   4   
Minimal/None   5   
Note: Red – Critical, Yellow – Moderate, Green – Negligible 
See Table 13 for risk number mapping 
 
Table 13: Fire Scout with UAV Radar Decoy Alternative Risk Number Mapping 
Risk Number Risk Significance Risk Description 
1 Critical UAV Operability 
2 Critical Availability 
3 Critical Range 
4 Moderate Accuracy – Probability of 
Seduction 
5 Moderate Technology Readiness 
 
The cost of improving the UAV radar decoy capability on a DDG could be high. 
According to Jane’s, the first production contract in the 1990s was worth $67.8 million 
U.S. dollars, for 7,000 units of GEN-X decoy (IHS Jane's 2005). This price includes the 
whole development of the GEN-X decoy system, which includes the ALE dispenser as 
well. To outfit Fire Scouts with the GEN-X decoys today would cost more than that ini-
tial contract, and there are costs involved such as system equipment, product develop-
ment, system procurement, and system installation. Table 14 shows the cost estimation 
which is based on the Navy budget for procurement of similar systems to the UAV radar 
decoy alternative. Team Crane assumed that there would be 62 DDGs to upgrade with the 
Fire Scout UAV radar decoy alternative. The cost estimate assumes the installation would 
take 5 years to complete, and the upgrade would have a total life cycle of 12 years. Sys-
tem procurement includes ALE-47 dispensers, installation of those dispensers, and GEN-
X decoys as shown in Table 14. The system procurement is based on the ALE-47 dis-
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pensers having a $0.06 million U.S. dollars unit cost in the Navy budget for dispenser 
procurement (Department Of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget Estimates 2009). 
Therefore, the total cost of ALE-47 dispensers on 62 Fire Scouts would be $37.2 million 
U.S. dollars over 5 years. According to Department Of the Navy Budget Estimates 2009, 
total installation cost of 62 dispensers on Fire Scouts would be $11.17 million U.S. 
dollars over 5 years (Department Of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget Estimates 
2009). It is assumed that the Fire Scout platform will hold 10 dispensers. This alternative 
also assumes that while each dispenser can hold up to 30 decoys, 10 would be filled with 
GEN-X decoys, leaving room for other types of countermeasures. Therefore, with 10 dis-
pensers per Fire Scout, and one Fire Scout per DDG, 620 dispensers would be needed for 
62 DDGs. There would be 100 decoys per DDG, which would be a total of 6200 decoys 
on 62 DDGs. According to Navy budget estimates, GEN-X Decoy cost would be $6105 
per decoy, so that total cost of 6200 decoys would be $37.851 million U.S. dollars over 5 
years (Procurement of Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps Budget Activity 1 2009). 
System Test & Evaluation is based on 25% of the test and evaluation cost of the 
Electromagnetic Systems Applied research program on UAV deployable infrared sensor 
payloads for 5 years with total cost of $7.37 million U.S. dollars (Research, 
Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy Budget Activity 1-3 2011). The management cost 
is based on 60% of the management cost of the Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance within 
the UAV Development Program (Navy Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
2012) for 12 years with a total cost of $7.47 million U.S. dollars. The system sustainment 
is based on 30% of the cost estimation, from the Navy budget for Operation and Mainte-
nance of the Surface Electronic Warfare Decoy for Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) with a total 
of $22.572 million U.S. dollars (Navy Operation and Maintenance 2012). Overall, the 
total cost to implement the Radar Decoy on Fire Scout Alternative across the DDG fleet 
of 62 ships is $124.243 million U.S. dollars or $2 million U.S. dollars per DDG for the 12 











Quantity  Percentage 











$0.00  1 100% 0 $0.00  
SYSTEM TEST & 
EVALUATION (Navy, 
Research, Development, 
Test and Evaluation 
2012) 




Development, Test and 
Evaluation 2012) 
$1.038 1 60% 12 $7.47 
SYSTEM  
PROCUREMENT  
        
ALE-47 Dispenser Pro-
curement (Department Of 
The Navy Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2010 Budget 
Estimates 2009) 
$0.06 620 100% 5 $37.2 
ALE-47 Installation 
(Department Of the Navy 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 
Budget Estimates 2009) 
$0.019 620 100% 5 $11.78 
GEN-X Decoy 
(Procurement of 
Ammunition, Navy and 
Marine Corps Budget 
Activity 1 2009) 
(Procurement of 
Ammunition, Navy and 
Marine Corps Budget 
Activity 1 2009) 





$6.27 1 30% 12 $22.572 
Total = $124.243 
 
C. FIRE SCOUT UAV 
The Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial Vehicle developed by 
Northrop Grumman is a helicopter-style UAV designed to perform reconnaissance mis-
sions for a destroyer. VTUAVs could assist a DDG with air defense in a number of ways. 
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The helicopter can be used to scout ahead of the DDG to provide situational awareness 
during port approach, using day/night cameras and infrared sensors to detect malicious 
UAVs. Various onboard weapon options exist for engaging UAVs. Anti-armor Hellfire 
missiles can be outfitted, along with Viper Strike Laser-Guided weapons. The most effec-
tive weapon currently outfitted on the helicopter is the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon 
System (APKWS), which are 2.75-inch laser-guided rockets with the ability to hit mov-
ing targets within 17 inches of the target (Barrie 2012). This weapon is most effective 
within the current UAV attack scenario, based upon the agility and speed it possesses to 
shoot down attack UAVs. Weapons that could be helpful against enemy UAVs, but have 
not yet been fitted for the Fire Scout are small caliber machine guns such as the M249 
5.56mm, which are currently fielded as light handheld machine guns. These small caliber 
weapons, combined with the APKWS would add another contingency to combat attack 
UAVs. The control and command equipment required for this alternative includes the 
Fire Scout itself and the communications equipment which is used to control it. It is sug-
gested that the Fire Scout could have the APKWS modifications for the fleet of DDGs for 
all missions, including the specific UAV attack scenario. 
 
 
Figure 21: Fire Scout (from BAE Systems 2012) 
 
Although the implementation of the UAV helicopter makes the DDG more pro-
tected against aerial attacks, there are associated risks involved. Obstacles that the UAV 
helicopter may face involve communications concerns, various controlling malfunctions, 
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and housing complications. The Fire Scout system has to have the ability to be operable 
which requires an information technology specialist, operator team, and a grounds crew 
for deployment and landing, increasing the ship’s personnel requirements. The helicopter 
uses a wireless data link connection, which is sometimes susceptible to latency of the da-
ta-link signal, which impedes real-time situational awareness as well as target engage-
ment (Cubic 2012). This risk has been evident in field testing on the MQ-8B Fire Scout 
where failed test missions were attributed to signal latency. Command malfunctions, such 
as a command that initiates the self-destruction sequence, can also impede situational 
awareness and combat missions by not responding to user commands even while the 
communications are operated properly (Times 2011). The DDG is also burdened with 
being able to store the helicopter aboard the vessel. Storage spaces on DDGs are at a min-
imum. The unarmed Fire Scout has been developed and tested on the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) platform in the U.S. Navy. Weapons systems have not yet been tested and the 
Fire Scout has not been fielded on any current DDGs. Based on the previous TRL discus-
sion in the Risk Assessment section, a TRL of 6 is assessed, meaning that it has not been 
tested in a relevant environment against a UAV swarm attack (Times 2011). However, 
the risks involving integration, usability, and technology readiness are moderate overall.  











Severe   2       
High           
Medium   3,4   1   
Low   5       
Minimal/None           
Note: Red – Critical, Yellow – Moderate, Green – Negligible 
See Table 16 for risk number mapping  
 
Table 16: Fire Scout UAV Alternative Risk Number Mapping 
Risk Number Risk Signifi-
cance 
Risks 
1 Critical Data link 
2 Critical Command Malfunctions 
3 Moderate Housing 
4 Moderate TRL6 
5 Moderate UAV Operations Staff 
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Based on Team Crane’s assumption of 62 DDGs, and one Fire Scout UAV per 
ship, this alternative involves 62 total Fire Scouts integrated with APKWS. Based upon 
estimates from the Northrop Grumman MQ-8B Fire Scout, the UAV helicopter cost is 
approximately $16.2 million U.S. dollars per UAV (Northrop-Grumman 2009), totaling 
$1.004 billion U.S. dollars for the entire fleet. Spares and repair parts, bought at the same 
time as the initial UAV procurements, yield $0.77 million U.S. dollars per UAV 
(Aeroweb n.d.), totaling $47.74 million U.S. dollars. An average of the total cost across 
21 existing UAVs, for spares during the 2011, 2012, and 2013 Fiscal Years, was taken 
and then multiplied by the fleet of 62 in the projected scenario.  
Since DDGs are not currently outfitted for the Fire Scout a cost of $1.47 million 
U.S. dollars per UAV is necessary for ship modifications yielding $91.14 million U.S. 
dollars under procurement. This cost scales up from the $41.4 million U.S. dollars in pro-
gram related logistics support, currently budgeted for the 28 ships that would potentially 
house the MQ-8B UAVs previously purchased by the U.S. Navy  (Navy, FISCAL YEAR 
(FY) 2012 BUDGET ESTIMATES 2011). The system test and evaluation cost for this 
alternative would be no larger than 50% of the current Fire Scout RDT&E costs of 
$104.60 million U.S. dollars budgeted for 2013 ((Aeroweb) 2012). Multiplying this year-
ly cost by the assumed five year T&E period for the current scenario yields $261.5M. 
The cost estimate for the APKWS rockets is based upon the Low Rate Initial Production 
Lot of 325 APKWS costing $15.3 million U.S. dollars (Daily 2012). The $15.3 million 
U.S. dollars is divided and the APKWS rockets are estimated to cost $47,000 per rocket. 
The Fire Scout is outfitted to carry 6 rockets per UAV, totaling $282,000 per 
UAV. A cost of $141,000 per UAV is also factored into the rocket procurement cost to 
provide each UAV with one set of three spare rockets, totaling $26.23 million U.S. dol-
lars for the entire fleet of UAVs. The rocket development is based on the budgeting for 
developing a training version of the APKWS rockets for the fixed wing A-10 platform 
with a baseline yearly cost of $0.221 million U.S. dollars in 2011 (Center 2011). The de-
sign and development of the APKWS Fire Scout adaptation could last five years at that 
rate for a total of $1.105 million U.S. dollars. Once development is complete, the cost for 
APKWS launcher integration for each Fire Scout should be no greater than 15% of the 
rocket procurement cost, which totals $3.93 million U.S. dollars for the entire fleet. The 
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system management and sustainment costs originate from the Department of the Navy 
fiscal year baseline budget for special operations (Navy, Fiscal Year Budget (FY) 
2009/FY 2010 2009) and maintenance support (Navy, Fiscal Year Budget (FY) 2013/FY 
2014 2012) for the 28 MQ-8B UAVs currently in the field. The baseline costs were $5.4 
million U.S. dollars and $47 million U.S. dollars respectively. These costs scaled up to 
accommodate the 62 DDG fleet. The main system development costs are based on the 
estimated systems development cost of $605 million U.S. dollars for the Fire Scout pro-
gram (Office 2010). As the assumed effort to integrate the Fire Scout on DDGs is much 
less than the original effort to develop the entire Fire Scout, the estimated cost should be 
no greater than 10% of the original development cost, yielding $61.605 million U.S. dol-
lars. These costs are included in Table 17. The grand total of $2120.98 million U.S. dol-
lars includes the complete life-cycle for the Fire Scout over a 12 year period. 
Table 17: Fire Scout UAV Cost Estimation 
Tasks Alternative Cost  




System Development (60.5+1.105) 61.605 5 61.605 
System Test & Evaluation 261.5 5 261.5 
System Management 5.4 12 64.8 
System Procurement (UAV manufac-
turing+APKWS (manufacturing and 
integration and spares)+ spares+ ship 
modifications)= 
(1.004B+26.23M+47.7M+91.14M) 
Estimated from FY 2011, 2012, 2013 
1169.07 5 1169.07 
System Sustainment (VTUAV 
Maintenance Support Baseline) 
47 12 564 
 Total = 2120.98 
 Total Without APKWS System= 2093.64 
 
D. ADDITIONAL CIWS 
The alternative upgrade would be to double the number of CIWS per DDG. Cur-
rently, there are only 2 per DDG. This would not be a complicated upgrade, as the CIWS 
is already a program of record. This puts the CIWS at a TRL of 9. The most difficult part 
about this effort would be to find locations on the DDG that would be suitable for addi-
tional CIWS. Having one more in the front as well as one more in the back would be ide-
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al, as it would essentially provide double the coverage. This configuration would allow 2 
CIWS to cover the front, 2 to cover the back, and 4 to cover the sides. These additions 
would be the greatest and only risk associated with the CIWS alternative. It is a risk be-
cause finding good locations to mount the additional CIWS would be troublesome and 
might interfere with other shipboard systems. Table 18 and Table 19 provide the risk as-
sessment and risk mapping. 
The cost per CIWS is $5.6 million U.S. dollars (Doehring 1999-2011). Since there 
would be 2 per DDG, a total cost of $11.2 million U.S. dollars is an estimate of how 
much this alternative would cost per DDG. There would not be any additional R&D costs 
but there would be an increase to the current $31.3 million U.S. dollars 
($3.2+$26.9+$1.2) budgeted for CIWS maintenance per year based on the Navy FY 2012 
budget (Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Budget Estimates, DoN 2012). These costs come from the 
CIWS in-service engineering, maintenance engineering, and overhaul maintenance. Since 
these are numbers for the currently fielded CIWS and this alternative involves doubling 
the number per DDG, it would create an at most 25% increase in the current budgeted 
costs. This brings the cost per year for maintenance to $7.825 million U.S. dollars 
($31.3*0.25). The system management cost increase is estimated at 25% of the $9.1 mil-
lion U.S. dollars budgeted for systems engineering of the CIWS in the FY12 Navy budg-
et. This cost is per year as well. Pages 250 and 261 of the Navy budget have this infor-
mation. The ammunition costs should stay about the same, if the current amount of am-
munition stays on the ship. This alternative is not to increase the duration that the CIWS 
can fire but rather increase the number of targets that can be engaged simultaneously. No 
additional suitability considerations need to be accounted for since they would just be 
included with the current CIWS. The results for the cost estimation can be seen in Table 
20. The total cost over the 12 year life cycle will be $815.6 million U.S. dollars across the 








Table 18: Additional CIWS Alternative Risk Assessment 
Risk Assessment Not 
Likely 




Severe      
High    1  
Medium      
Low      
Minimal/None      
Note: Red – Critical, Yellow – Moderate, Green – Negligible 
See Table 19 for risk number mapping 
 
Table 19: Additional CIWS Alternative Risk Number Mapping 
Risk Number Risk Significance Risks 
1 Critical Locations to put additional 
CIWS  
 
Table 20: CIWS Alternative Cost Estimation 
Tasks 
 Reference Cost 
($M) 
 Percentage of 






 Alternative Cost 
Estimate ($M) 
System  
Development $ 0 0% 0 =$0 
System Test and 
Evaluation $ 0 0% 0 =$0 
System  
Management $9.10 25% 12 =$27.3 
System  
Procurement 
$ 694.4  




($3.2+$26.9+$1.2) 25% 12 =$93.9 
Total = $815.60 
 
E. LAWS (LASER WEAPON SYSTEM) 
The Laser Weapon System (LaWS) alternative would be used to shoot down 
UAVs using a powerful laser. The LaWS solution produces an incoherent beam by com-
bining six lasers in a closed packed ring topology of sub-apertures (Rourke 2011). This is 
fired through a beam combiner and expander and all six beams act as one single laser. 
The system can shoot down UAVs at shorter ranges and blind UAV sensors at longer 
ranges. The U.S. Navy has conducted two successful tests with the LaWS added to the 
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CIWS. The beam director of the LaWS is added to the left side of the CIWS mount and 
another LaWS component is bolted to the right side of the CIWS dome. A picture of this 
can be seen in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22: Rendering of the LaWS on the CIWS (From Rourke 2011) 
 
In June 2009, LaWS successfully engaged five UAVs in a combat representative 
scenario in the desert. In May 2010, LaWS successfully engaged four UAVs in a combat 
representative scenario about one nautical mile off the California coast. This test demon-
strated the ability to destroy UAVs in an over-the-water setting and the ability to reversi-
bly jam and disrupt electro-optical/infrared sensors that would be located on a UAV. A 
LaWS with about 100 kW of power would be necessary to destroy a UAV and the Navy 
plans to increase the current beam power of 33 kW to 100 kW by 2014 (Rourke 2011). 
With any alternative, there are advantages and limitations. Some advantages in-
clude the low marginal cost per shot. The Navy estimates that it would only cost pennies 
per shot fired with the LaWS compared to million U.S. dollars with missile defenses 
(Rourke 2011). There are also an unlimited number of shots that can be taken with the 
LaWS, as long as the platform can supply electricity. Lasers also travel at the speed of 
light, so a fast engagement time is another advantage. In addition, radically maneuvering 
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air targets cannot escape the speed and precision of a laser. There is also a low risk of 
collateral damage with lasers because they are so precise. These advantages eliminate 
suitability considerations as risks. 
Lasers can only attack one target at a time and it can take several seconds to disa-
ble the target in question. This means that only having one laser on a ship could be a 
problem for multiple fast moving targets, such as suicidal UAVs. This is also the greatest 
risk given that 8 UAVs need to be engaged at one time. The limitations are the risks in 
the case of LaWS (Rourke 2011). Table 21 and Table 22 present the risk assessment and 
risk mapping. 
Table 21: LaWS Alternative Risk Assessment 
Risk 
Assessment 






Severe      
High      
Medium    1  
Low  2    
Minimal/None      
Note: Red – Critical, Yellow – Moderate, Green – Negligible 
See Table 22 for risk number mapping 
 
Table 22: LaWS Risk Number Mapping 
Risk Number Risk Significance Risks 
1 Critical Number of Targets  
2 Moderate TRL 
 
As of December 2010, LaWS was at a TRL of 5. The Navy estimates that it might 
cost $150 million U.S. dollars to develop and test LaWS to TRL 7. The Navy believes a 
production version of LaWS could be on surface ships around FY2017. Since this would 
be a 5 year effort, 20% of the cost would be allocated per year. This can be seen with the 
cost estimation process in Table 23. The Navy also estimates that the production copies 
could be installed and procured as additions to ship CIWS mounts for a total cost of $17 
million U.S. dollars per CIWS mount (Rourke 2011). There would be no ordnance costs, 
no logistics tail for maintaining the ordnance, and no fire suppression costs associated 
with the LaWS. The sustainment cost for the LaWS is estimated to increase the current 
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$31.3 million U.S. dollars ($3.2+$26.9+$1.2) budgeted for CIWS maintenance per year 
based on the Navy FY 2012 budget (Navy 2011). These costs come from the CIWS in-
service engineering, maintenance engineering, and overhaul maintenance. These are 
numbers are for the currently fielded CIWS, and the addition of LaWS to the CIWS 
would create an estimated 25% increase in the current budgeted costs. This brings the 
cost per year for maintenance to $7.825 million U.S. dollars ($31.3*0.25). The system 
management cost is estimated at 25% of the $9.1 million U.S. dollars in the FY12 Navy 
budget for the systems engineering of the CIWS. This cost is per year as well (Navy 
2011, 250, 261). Since there are currently 2 CIWS per destroyer, the total procurement 
cost per destroyer would be $2108 million U.S. dollars ($17*2). The results for the cost 
estimation can be seen in Table 23. The total cost over the life cycle will be $2379.2 mil-
lion U.S. dollars. 
Table 23: LaWS Cost Estimation 
Tasks  Reference Cost Percentage 












Development $ 100 20% 5 =$100 
System Test and 
Evaluation $ 50 20% 5 =$50 
System  
Management $9.1 25% 12 =$27.3 
System  
Procurement $ 2108 (34*62) 100% 5 =$2108 
System  
Sustainment $ 31.3 ($3.2+$26.9+$1.2) 25% 12 =$93.9 
Total= 2379.2 
 
F. ADDITIONAL SMALL ARMS 
As previously discussed in the section titled “AEGIS DDG Defensive Capabili-
ties,” small arms mounts provide the DDG with a last line of defense against incoming 
UAVs. The following proposed alternative increases the number of small arms mounts in 
an attempt to defend the DDG from a swarm of UAVs. The additional mounts include a 
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combination of the MK-38 MOD2 and the M2HB 0.50 caliber machine gun with Com-
mon Remotely Operated Weapon Station (CROWS) II (M2HB 0.50 CROWS II).  
This alternative involves the combination of two additional MK-38 MOD2 
mounts, one M2HB 0.50 CROWS II mount, and upgrading the current four M2HB 0.50 
machine guns to the M2HB 0.50 CROWS II mount. The CROWS II was designed for 
small weapon systems and adds a thermal imager with autofocus and e-zoom, an eye safe 
laser range finder, a color daylight camera, and it stabilizes the weapon system with re-
spect to the ship’s movement, providing target tracking and engagement capabilities 
(Army Guide 2008). The implementation of the combination of M2HB 0.50 CROWS II 
and the MK-38 MOD2 would provide safety for the operators and increase the accuracy, 
firepower, and area of protection for the DDG against UAV swarm attacks. The layout of 
the Small Arms Alternative is shown in Figure 23.  
 
 
Figure 23: Layout of Small Arms Mounts Alternative (After Seaforces.org 2012) 
There are risks associated with the implementation of the Small Arms Mounts Al-
ternative. The MK-38 MOD2 has been developed, tested, integrated, and fielded. The 
M2HB 0.50 CROWS II has been widely used on variety of platforms in the U.S Armed 
Forces. The Program Offices have been in place to procure, manage, and sustain these 
small arms mounts. Additional small arms mounts would require additional operators 






new operators is low because the Navy can utilize the existing training programs for these 
small arms mounts for additional crew to operate the additional small arms mounts.  
The small arms mounts have been developed, tested, and fielded on variety of 
platforms in the U.S. Armed Forces. However, they have not been tested against a UAV 
swarm attack. Based on previous TRL discussion in the Risks Assessment Section, Team 
Crane assesses the technology readiness of the small arms mounts against a UAV swarm 
attack at TRL8. Therefore, the risks involving integration, availability, usability, sustain-
ment, and technology readiness are low.  
The upgraded M2HB 0.50 caliber machine guns with the CROWS II system 
would increase the accuracy of the M2HB 0.50 caliber machine guns, as well as provide 
more safety for the DDG crew with the remote controlled capability. The combination of 
MK-38 MOD2 and M2HB 0.50 CROWS II implementation also provides additional area 
of protection to the DDG against not only UAV swarm attacks but small boats attacks as 
well. However, the small arms mounts still have limitations due to the required ammuni-
tion reload, which poses a high risk to the crew during combat. In particular, larger UAVs 
would require more hits from small arms mounts in order to be neutralized, reducing the 
effectiveness of the additional mounts. Therefore, the limitation of small arms firepower, 
ammunition load capacity, and range incur high risk to neutralize UAVs swarm attacks 
on their own. Table 24 and Table 25 provide the risk assessment and the risk mapping. 
Table 24: Small Arms Mounts Alternative Risks Assessment 
Risk  
Assessment 
Not Likely Low  
Likelihood 




Severe      
High    1,2,3 4 
Medium      
Low 9 5,7,8 6   
Minimal/None      
Note: Red – Critical, Yellow – Moderate, Green – Negligible 








Table 25: Small Arms Mounts Alternative Risks List 
Risk Number  Risk Significance Risk Description 
1 Critical Small Arms Mounts Range 
2 Critical Small Arms Mounts Accuracy 
3 Critical Small Arms Mounts Fire Power 
4 Critical Ammunition Load and Reload 
5 Moderate Integration with DDG Baseline Combat System 
6 Moderate Additional Personnel Requirement 
7 Moderate Small Arms Mounts Availability 
8 Moderate Small Arms Mounts Sustainability 
9 Negligible Technology Readiness 
 
The cost to implement the small arms mounts alternative is low. Since the small 
arms mounts have been developed, tested, and fielded, there would be no cost for system 
development. In addition, there would be costs for small arms mounts procurement, in-
stallation, and sustainment, as well as minor costs for system acceptance test and man-
agement. Team Crane assumed that there would be 62 DDGs (DDG 51— DDG 112) to 
upgrade with the Small Arms Mounts Alternative. The cost estimate assumes that the in-
stallation would take 5 years to complete, and the upgrade would have the total life-cycle 
of 12 years. The system T&E is based on 25% of the Navy budget for Precision Strike 
Weapons Development Program, carrier suitability testing (Navy Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation 2012) for five years with a total of $1.25 million U.S. 
dollars because only government acceptance tests to validate the small arms mounts in-
stallation are required for this alternative instead of full development T&E. The system 
procurement is based on the MK-38 MOD2 $1.13 million U.S. dollars unit cost and the 
M2HB 0.50 caliber machine gun $0.014 million U.S. dollars unit cost from the Navy 
budget for weapons procurement (Navy Weapons Procurement 2012) and the CROWS II 
$0.08 million U.S. dollars average unit cost from the CROWS II program (Army Guide 
2008). Assuming that the small arms mounts installation cost is 50% of the unit cost, pro-
curement totals $251.10 million U.S. dollars spread over five years. The system sustain-
ment is based on 30% of the cost estimation from the Navy budget for Operation and 
Maintenance of the Joint Advanced Strike Technology for FY12 with a total of $100.8 
million U.S. dollars (Navy Operation and Maintenance 2012). The management cost is 
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based on 60% of the management cost of the Very Low Collateral Damage Weapon pro-
ject within the Precision Strike Weapons Development Program (Navy Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation 2012) for 12 years with a total cost of $8.64 million 
U.S. dollars. Overall, the total cost to implement the Small Arms Mounts Alternative 
across the DDG fleet of 62 is $361.79 million U.S. dollars or $5.84 million U.S. dollars 
per DDG for the 12 year life cycle. All of these cost estimates can be found in Table 26.  
















SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT $0.00  1 100% 0 $0.00  
SYSTEM TEST & EVALUA-
TION (Navy Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation 
2012)  
$1.00  1 25% 5 $1.25  
SYSTEM MANAGEMENT 
(Navy Research, Development, 
Test and Evaluation 2012) 
$1.20  1 60% 12 $8.64  
SYSTEM PROCUREMENT         $251.10  
MK 38 MOD2 Procurement (Navy 
Weapons Procurement 2012) 
$1.13  124 100% 5 $139.62  
MK 38 MOD2 Installation (Navy 
Weapons Procurement 2012) 
$0.56  124 100% 5 $69.94  
M2HB 50 Cal (Navy Weapons 
Procurement 2012) 
$0.014  62 100% 5 $4.34  
CROWS II (Army Guide 2008) $0.08  310 100% 5 $24.80  
M2HB 50 CROW II Installation 
(Estimation=50% cost of procure-
ment cost) 
$0.04  310 100% 5 $12.40  
SYSTEM SUSTAINMENT 
(Navy Operation and Maintenance 
2012) 
$28.00  1 30% 12 $100.80  
Total = $361.79  
 
G. ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) JAMMING 
This alternative extends the current EW capabilities of the DDG to full spectrum 
coverage in order to defeat RC UAVs. The Harpy UAVs would not be affected by this 
improvement, as they use GPS as their guidance system until there is a radar signature 
detected which then guides them to the target (Harpy Air Defense Suppression System 
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2006). This means there would be no guidance signal to jam. There will be a full 360 de-
grees of coverage from the EW improvement. The technical capabilities of the EW im-
provement (such as frequency, distance, techniques, output power, etc.) are classified in-
formation and will not be discussed further.  
To defeat a RC UAV using EW, the uplink and/or downlink signal(s) would need 
to be disrupted. Jamming the RC UAV’s datalink can execute a soft kill by denying the 
operators command guidance capability. If the UAV is being piloted by a remote opera-
tor, loss of the command guidance signal can cause a hard kill to the UAV. This would 
only happen if no automatic return to home capability is implemented on the loss of the 
datalink (Mirkarimi 2003). Another alternative outside the scope of this project includes 
intercepting and acquiring the UAV’s datalink signals and using them to determine what 
the threat system is seeing. If it is targeting the DDG, the system could replicate the sig-
nals to surreptitiously insert false return-to-home coordinates, or turn off vital flight con-
trol systems. This is a more advanced alternative that would require more research. 
There are risks associated with the requirements that the EW alternative must 
meet. These include spectrum, threat speed, engagement range, and energy signature. The 
energy signature, engagement range, and threat speed are the highest risks. Increasing the 
spectrum coverage would require time, research, integration efforts, testing, and money. 
There could be difficulty successfully integrating the upgraded system with the DDG. 
The threat speed is high risk because there is the possibility that the UAV could reach the 
destroyer if the signal cannot be jammed fast enough. The engagement range is high risk 
because the power will need to be kept down due to the near-shore scenario, meaning that 
the EW alternative might not be effective far enough out to prevent a collision. The ener-
gy signature is high risk because the jammer could be too high power which can be very 
dangerous when higher power outputs are used with a near-shore scenario. This also 
means that the RF radiation could violate local frequency control laws and could make 
the DDG a more noticeable target to Harpy UAVs.  
The technology readiness is not a risk because the TRL is at an 8. The technology 
already exists but has not been integrated into DDGs yet. This leads to the last risk, ex-
tensibility. The extensibility could be a risk because the EW alternative upgrade might 
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not be a feasible upgrade with the current EW systems aboard the DDG. There could be 
hardware integration issues with the existing radar or EW systems.  









Severe      
High    2 1 
Medium  4,5 3   
Low      
Minimal/None      
Note: Red – Critical, Yellow – Moderate, Green – Negligible 
See Table 28 for risk number mapping 
 
Table 28: EW Alternative Risk Number Mapping 
Risk Number Risk Significance Risks 
1 Critical Energy Signature  
2 Critical Engagement Range  
3 Critical Threat Speed 
4 Moderate Spectrum  
5 Moderate Extensibility 
 
Table 29 shows a cost estimate to extend the current EW capabilities of the DDGs 
to full spectrum coverage. 
Table 29: EW Alternative Cost Estimation 
Tasks  Reference Cost  Percentage of 









System Development $ 47.22 100% 5 =$236.1 
System Test and 
Evaluation $ 4.52 100% 5 =$22.6 
System Management $2.1 100% 12 =$25.2 
System Procurement $ 632 (10.2*62) 20% 5 =$632 
System Sustainment $ 9.4 100% 12 =$112 
Total = $1,027.9 
 
Team Crane has assumed that there would be 62 DDGs that need to be upgraded with the 
EW capabilities alternative. The cost estimate assumes that the installation would take 5 
years to complete, and the upgrade would have the total life-cycle of 12 years. 
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The development cost to extend the current EW capabilities is $236.1 million 
U.S. dollars. The cost is assumed to be the 7% of Navy 2012 budget for EW Combat 
Support (Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy 2012). Extending the EW 
capabilities would require 7% of the assigned budget due to the complexity of upgrading 
existing capabilities. The most common barriers are compatibility and integration with 
other systems. 
The total cost for the EW capabilities alternative test & evaluation is estimated to 
be $22.6 million U.S. dollars. The cost is assumed to be the same cost as the Navy FY06 
budget for the Shipboard EW Improvement test and evaluation support (DoN 2006). 
The total system management cost for the EW capabilities alternative is $2.1 mil-
lion U.S. dollars per year, for a total cost of $25.2 million U.S. dollars for 12 years. The 
cost is assumed to be the same cost as the Navy FY 05 budget for the Shipboard EW Im-
provement support (DoN 2006). 
The procurement cost for the EW capabilities alternative is $10.2 million U.S. 
dollars per DDG, with total cost of $632 million U.S. dollars for the 62 DDGs. The pro-
curement cost is assumed to be the same as the Navy FY 2011 budget estimated for the 
SLQ-32 EW Block 2 electronic support improvements (DoN 2011). 
The sustainment total cost is $9.4 million U.S. dollars per year. The cost for the 
entire fleet (62 DDGs) for a 12-year period is $112 million U.S. dollars. The system sus-
tainment cost is assumed to be the same as the Navy 2010 budget estimates for the SLQ-
32 system support (DoN 2011). The total cost to extend the current EW capabilities alter-
native for the entire fleet composed of 62 DDGs is $1.028 billion dollars for the 12 year 
life cycle. 
H. SHIP BASED RADAR DECOY 
Ship-based radar decoys provide the DDG protection against incoming missile at-
tacks and send the threat away. They could also provide similar protection against the 
radar-seeking Harpy UAVs. The ship-based radar decoy alternative could make use of a 
decoy launcher developed by Lockheed Martin. This decoy launcher is called the Auto-
matic Launch of Expendable (the ALEX). The decoys attempt to attract threats away 





Figure 24: Lockheed Martin’s ALEX system (From Lockheed Martin 2012) 
 
The ALEX system is capable of operating as stand-alone equipment. It also can 
interface with a ship’s electronic support systems (Jane's Radar And Electronic Warfare 
Systems 2011). 
There are risks involved with integrating a system like ALEX on DDGs. This sys-
tem depends on computer-controlled operation to launch decoys. There is high risk of 
electronics failure because occurrence of a failure during real-time operation could pre-
vent a decoy from launching in time to attract a threat. Redeployment risk is moderate 
because the system can be upgraded based on customer need to use more advanced decoy 
cartridges. Accuracy has a minimal risk because launch timing is automatic and can be 
overridden to manual control for better timing accuracy. The TRL is not a risk for this 
system because the TRL is at an 8. The technology already exists but has not been inte-
grated into DDGs yet.  
Table 30: Ship Based Radar Decoy Alternative Risk Assessment 
Risk Assessment Not 
Likely 




Severe     1 
High    2  
Medium    1  
Low  4 3   
Minimal/None  5    
Note: Red – Critical, Yellow – Moderate, Green – Negligible 




Table 31: Ship Based Radar Decoy Alternative Risk Mapping 
Risk Number Risk Significance Risks 
1 Critical  Interference with Detection systems 
2 Critical Launch Control Reliability 
3 Moderate Redeployment re-loading 
4 Moderate Logistics 
5 Negligible Accuracy – Probability of Seduction 
 
The cost to implement the Ship-based Radar Decoys alternative is high. The costs 
will include ship-based radar decoys procurement, installation, sustainment, test and 
evaluation, and system management. Team Crane assumed that there are 62 DDGs to up-
grade with the Ship-based Radar decoy system alternative. The cost estimate assumes 
that the installation would take 5 years to complete, and the upgrade would have a total 
life cycle of 12 years. The system test and evaluation is based on 25% of the Navy budget 
for NULKA Decoy Development program (Navy, Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation 2012) for five years with a total of $3.29 million U.S. dollars. The manage-
ment cost is based on 60% of the management cost of the Anti-ship missile decoy system 
for NULKA Decoy project (Navy Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 2012) for 
12 years with a total cost of $2.304 million U.S. dollars. The system procurement is 
based on the NULKA Decoy system cost of $14.294 million U.S. dollars per launch sys-
tem which also includes 10 NULKA decoys. Thus, the total cost for 62 systems for 62 
DDGs would be $886.228 million U.S. dollars based on the Navy budget for Anti-ship 
missile decoy system (Department Of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Budget Estimates 
2011). Based on the Anti-missile decoy system installation (Department Of the Navy 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Budget Estimates 2011) for 1 system, installation would cost $1.6 
million U.S. dollars, so the total cost would be $111.6 million U.S. dollars spread over 
five years. The system sustainment is based on 30% of the cost estimation from the Navy 
budget for Operation and Maintenance of the Anti-Ship Missile Decoys for Fiscal Year 
12 (FY12) with a total of $27.288 million U.S. dollars (Navy Operation and Maintenance 
2012). Overall, the total cost to implement the Ship-Based Radar Decoy System Alterna-
tive across the DDG fleet of 62 ships is $1.1083 billion U.S. dollars or $16.42 million 








Quantity  Percentage of 










$0.00  1 100% 0 $0.00  
SYSTEM TEST &  
EVALUATION (Navy, 
Research, Development, Test 
and Evaluation 2012) 
$2.632  1 25% 5 $3.29 
SYSTEM  
MANAGEMENT (Navy, 
Research, Development, Test 
and Evaluation 2012) 
$0.320 1 60% 12 $2.304 
SYSTEM  
PROCUREMENT  
        
Ship-based radar launch sys-
tem Procurement (including 
decoys) (Department Of the 
Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 
Budget Estimates 2011) 
$14.294 62 100% 5 $886.228 
Ship-based Radar Decoy 
Installation (Department Of 
the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 
2012 Budget Estimates 2011) 
$1.6 62 100% 5 $99.2 
SYSTEM  
SUSTAINMENT (Navy 
Operation and Maintenance 
2012) 
$7.58 1 30% 12 $27.288 
Total = $1018.31 
 
I. SMOKESCREEN ALTERNATIVE 
The smokescreen generator system is one of the proposed alternatives to deter, 
prevent and/or defeat RC UAV attacks against DDGs. The smokescreen generator alter-
native would improve the DDG’s ability to defeat UAV swarm attacks by providing an 
additional layer of defensive capability. When a UAV threat is detected by any of the 
DDG detection mechanics, the smokescreen generator system discharges a smokescreen 
providing full 360 degree coverage. 
The smokescreen generator alternative is very effective against a UAV swarm at-
tack due to its ability to protect the DDG by disrupting the optical link between the RC 
UAV controller and the UAV, prompting the UAV to crash into the water or fly away 
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from the DDG while providing more time to the DDG to generate an offensive response. 
RC UAVs are controlled remotely by the operator; the absence of visibility from the op-
erator makes it extremely difficult to operate the UAV. 
A smokescreen is a deceptive tactic which dates back thousands of years, and has 
been used successfully through human history. For example, the ancient Greeks were 
known for their astuteness in battlefield matters, and were pioneers of the smokescreen, 
which was largely used during the Peloponnesian War, 431 to 404 BC (Smart 1997). 
The smokescreen was frequently used during World Wars I and II, but its use was 
discontinued due to the negative effect on human health and the environment; challenges 
from the past still remain as an obstacle to the implementation of the smokescreen gener-
ator alternative on U.S. destroyers. The bigger concerns and/or obstacles are described by 
the Army and other military branches as “exposure to heavy smoke concentrations for 
extended periods (particularly if near the source of emission) may cause illness or even 
death” (ARMY, et al. 1995). 
Currently, a smoke generator does not exist that is able to cover a DDG in a mat-
ter of seconds to avoid UAV swarm attacks. The development and design of a 
smokescreen generator with the said capacities is a high risk acquisition. The reason it is 
high risk is because the development of new technologies is not an easy task; delays, 
cost, technology maturity and development constraints can all contribute toward program 
failure. 
Table 33 shows a risk assessment of the risks associated with the smokescreen 
generator alternative, and provides adequate information to predict the impact of the risk 
and the likelihood that each will occur.  
Table 33: Smokescreen Alternative Risk Assessment 
Risk 
Assessment 






Severe      
High    2,3 1,4 
Medium   5   
Low    6  
Minimal/None      
Note: Red – Critical, Yellow – Moderate, Green – Negligible 




Some of the risks associated with the alternative are showed in Table 34. The 
smokescreen generator alternative will affect any enemy RC UAV, but also affect friend-
ly systems and weapons in the vicinity, due to the nature of the alternative (which releas-
es a smokescreen into the air). The operational environment is a high risk item; the re-
lease of smoke into the air will affect some ship defense systems, such as small arms, due 
to the lack of visibility. Another high risk item is the hazard to human health, as the resi-
due of the smoke can cause respiratory problems, skin problems or even death. The crew 
must wear gas masks when the smoke generator is being used (ARMY, et al. 1995). 
Table 34: Smokescreen Alternative Risk Mapping 
Risk Number Risk Significance Risk Description 
1 Critical Operational Environment 
2 Critical Small Arms 
3 Critical Visual surveillance 
4 Critical Human Health Hazard 
5 Moderate Technology Readiness Level 
6 Moderate Friend or Foe Identification 
 
Technology readiness represents an additional risk. The smoke screen alternative 
is feasible; it has been used in military vehicles to cover small areas, but not on a large 
scale, such as on Navy ships (Military Analysis Network 2000). Therefore, the TRL of 
the smokescreen generator alternative is TR5, and further development is needed in order 
to implement and field a system able to disrupt a UAV attack swarm. One of the bigger 
challenges is the location and installation of the generators, and the exhaust pipes trans-
porting the smoke coming out of the generators. The logistics involved may require the 
ship to stay in port for months while such an installation is performed. 
The requirements for the smokescreen generator alternative for Navy ship appli-
cations are that it would need to be able to cover the average area of a DGG of 4150 m2 
within 7 seconds or less, and in doing so, be able to protect the DDG against a UAV 
swarm attack detected at medium to long range (500m - 1000m). The M157A2 smoke 
release rate is classified. However, for academic purposes, it is assumed that the M157A2 
is capable of covering 68 m2 over a twenty second time period. An area of 68 m2 is as-
sumed because it is sufficient to cover a group of three MMWV simultaneously. Given 
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that the ship area of 4150 m2 is 61 times larger than the vehicle area of 68 m2, 61 genera-
tors are needed to cover the DDG.   
Table 35 shows a cost estimate for a smokescreen generator system. The require-
ment is to cover 61 times more area than a single M157A2’s capabilities in order to pro-
vide adequate protection to DDGs.  
Table 35: Smokescreen Alternative Cost Estimation 
Tasks  Life cycle Alternative Cost Estimate 
(DDG Fleet) (M) 
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT $100.00 
SYSTEM TEST &  
EVALUATION 
$14.4 
SYSTEM MANAGEMENT  $24  
SYSTEM PROCUREMENT $1781  
SYSTEM SUSTAINMENT $94.8 
Total = $2.014 Billion  
 
Team Crane has assumed that there would be 62 DDGs (DDG 51—DDG 112) to 
be upgraded with the smokescreen generation alternative. The cost estimate assumes that 
the installation would take 5 years to complete, and the upgrade would have the total life-
cycle of 12 years. 
Not enough economic data of the M157A2 was found to determine the cost in-
curred to develop the system. The M58 Wolf Smoke Generator has similar functionality 
to the M157A2 (Military Analysis Network 1995). The M58 and M157A2 economic data 
is used to estimate the total cost for the DDG smokescreen generator. 
The development cost of the M157A2 is assumed to be $8.8 million U.S. dollars 
(Department of the Army Financial Management and Comptroller 1997). The assumed 
estimate development cost is $100 million U.S. dollars, and it is assumed to increase 
drastically in comparison with the M157A2, due to the amount of effort to redesign and 
integrate the smokescreen generator with other systems in the DDG. The generators to be 
developed and installed on the DDGs are to be able to cover 61 times more area than the 
M157A2, but in half of the time. The smokescreen alternative has not been developed 
and tested to cover an area equivalent to the size of a DDG. Research and experimenta-
tion would be required to mature the technology. 
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The total cost for the DDG smokescreen system test and evaluation is assumed to 
be $14.4 million U.S. dollars. The cost is assumed to be the same cost as the Army FY 
1997 budget for the smoke, obscurant and target defeating system engineering develop-
ment (Department of the Army Financial Management and Comptroller 1997).  
The total system management cost for the smoke screen alternative is $2 million 
U.S. dollars per year, for a total cost of $24 million U.S. dollars for 12 years. The cost is 
assumed to be the same cost as the Army FY 2003 budget for the M56/58 smokescreen 
generator system (Department of the Army Procurement Programs 2003).  
The procurement cost is based on the Army FY 2003 budget estimated for the 
M56/58 smokescreen generator system, with a cost of $362,142 each (Department of the 
Army Procurement Programs 2003). The procurement total cost for 62 DDG systems is 
assumed to be 30% greater than the Army FY 2003 budget estimated for the M56/58, be-
cause the DDG version would require more research and development, is highly difficult 
to install, and finally, requires more design effort, as the system is more complex. The 
total cost for the procurement per DDG is $28.72 million U.S. dollars, given by $362,142 
times 61 plus 30%. The total procurement cost for the DDG alternative (for the 62 
DDGs) is $1.8 billion dollars. 
The sustainment total costs are $7.9 million U.S. dollars per year. The cost for the 
entire fleet (62 DDGs) for a 12-year period is $94.8 million U.S. dollars. The system sus-
tainment cost is assumed to be the same as the Army 2003 budget estimates for smoke 
generator systems, with a cost of $7.9 million U.S. dollars per year (Department of the 
Army 2002).  
The total cost to implement the smokescreen alternative for the entire fleet com-
posed of 62 DDGs is $2.014 billion dollars for the 12 year life cycle. 
J. REACTIVE ARMOR 
The Tactical Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG) Airbag Protection System 
(TRAPS) system involves ‘close-in’ protection using airbags located around a vehicle to 
minimize the damage from RPGs. This system was designed by Textron. The Chief 
Technology Officer Thomas McNamara, of Textron Systems Corporation had this to say 




The system is compatible with multiple military vehicle types, and it de-
livers reliable, robust performance against different RPG threats while 
minimizing costly, time-consuming modifications and vehicle recertifica-
tion tests. In addition, TRAPS offers significantly lower weight and 
demonstrated lower collateral damage than competing active protection 
systems. Following the successful Object Storage Device (OSD) testing, 
we are prepared to deliver the customer a mature, affordable and rapidly 
deployable active vehicle protection solution. (Eshel 2010) 
 
The proposed alternative for reactive armor would be to use the TRAPS system to 
help defeat UAVs at a close range if they were to penetrate through all other defense sys-
tems. The idea would be to locate TRAPS around the DDG in critical locations to help 
minimize the damage to the hull as well as to antennas. One team member spoke with the 
program director of TRAPS to determine how TRAPS could be used to help defend 
against UAVs. His recommendation was to not use TRAPS at all, as it would not be ef-
fective against suicidal UAVs. He made it very clear that the TRAPS system was de-
signed for smaller threats like RPGs and would have very little effect against a larger 
threat such as a UAV. He also made the point that the UAV could not be defeated at that 
close of a range, as it is a threat with just too much mass. His suggestion was to stick to 
other alternatives that involved defeating UAVs away from the DDG. Per his recommen-
dation, the team decided that the reactive armor alternative is not a feasible alternative for 
this project. The costs, risks, and TRL still need to be addressed. Since the current tech-
nology would not be applicable to the UAV threat, the TRL is at 0. The costs could not 
be estimated, since nothing has been started with this technology. The risks include cost, 
TRL, scalability, and usability. Cost is a risk because it is unknown how much this alter-
native would cost. TRL is risk because basic technology research has not even been start-
ed. Usability is a risk with this system because there is only one use per TRAPS installa-
tion. Scalability is a risk; if the current TRAPS were to be scaled up to be a defensive so-
lution for a DDG then it might not be effective at all, as the TRAPS program director 
stated. Table 36 and Table 37 provide the risk assessment and the risk mapping. 
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Severe   2   
High   4  1 
Medium      
Low     3 
Minimal/None      
Note: Red – Critical, Yellow – Moderate, Green – Negligible 
See Table 37 for risk number mapping  
 
Table 37: TRAPS Alternative Risk Mapping 
Risk Number Risk Significance  Risks 
1 Critical  TRL 
2 Critical  Cost 
3 Moderate  Usability 





VI. SYSTEM ALTERNATIVE MODEL RESULTS AND COST 
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
This section evaluates the engagement alternatives, discussed in the previous sec-
tion, based on how well the alternatives improve the performance over the modeled base-
line. After modeling results have been established for the engagement alternatives, a cost 
benefit analysis was conducted. The results of the cost benefit analysis identified the most 
economical alternatives and the potential combinations of alternatives that are predicted 
to protect the DDG from a swarm of UAVs. 
A. MODEL RESULTS 
The results for each alternative are displayed to convey the effectiveness in com-
parison to the baseline model results. Each alternative was an addition to the baseline 
model using the Monte Carlo method to analyze results. Figure 25 shows a pictorial rep-




Figure 25: Modeling Parameters for Alternatives 
 
Figure 25 displays the associated range for each alternative as well as what type 
of UAV the alternative is able to engage. The ranges represent distance from the DDG 
with Range 5 being the farthest from the ship and Range 0 being the actual ship. For ex-
ample, it can be seen that the RC Jammer is only able to engage the RC UAVs at Range 
2, whereas CIWS is able to engage both the RC and Harpy UAVs at both Ranges 3 and 4. 
It can be noted that the P(kill) for CIWS and LAWS is increased at a closer range. 
The modeling results for the alternatives were put in terms of the outcome proba-
bility for the number of successful suicide UAVs, to better demonstrate comparison to the 
baseline. For each alternative, the team conducted a simulation of 500 trials, and each 
trial resulted in a number of UAV hits scored on the DDG, ranging from zero to eight. 
The simulation data showed how many of those 500 runs resulted in each possible out-
come. Dividing the number of runs resulting in each outcome by 500 yielded a probabil-
ity. The graphs show cumulative outcome probability, making it easy to see how likely it 
is to have no more than a given number of UAVs impact the ship. In order to demonstrate 
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each alternative’s percent decrease in UAV hits scored on the DDG from the baseline 
model, the average number of UAV hits was recorded for both the baseline and the alter-
natives. 
1. LaWS Modeling Results 
Figure 26 displays the LaWS alternative compared to the baseline model for a 
swarm of eight UAVs attacking a DDG. The implementation of LaWS improves the 
baseline model by improving the CIWS base accuracy and cycle time by 20 percent. 
Changing these parameters improves the CIWS performance in the baseline model for 
both long and medium ranges. The team assumed that accuracy would be increased be-
cause the laser would fire in a perfectly straight line, and therefore increased CIWS accu-
racy by 20 percent in the model. The team assumed that cycle time would be reduced be-
cause battle damage assessment would depend less on the time it takes for the bullets to 
reach the target. As such, the cycle time was reduced by 20 percent in the model. Adding 
this alternative to the baseline model resulted in a 1.3 percent decrease in average UAV 
hits on the DDG. 
 
 
Figure 26: LaWS Alternative Results 
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2. UAV Radar Decoy Modeling Results 
Figure 27 displays the UAV-launched radar decoy alternative compared to the 
baseline model for a swarm of eight UAVs attacking a DDG. The implementation of the 
UAV radar decoy improves the baseline model by increasing the amount of Harpy UAVs 
destroyed at long range. Because the Fire Scout would launch its multiple radar decoys 
once a single UAV is detected, it has the capability to engage multiple Harpy UAVs, in-
cluding ones that have not yet been detected. Provided at least one UAV is detected, the 
radar decoy has a 0.4 chance of seducing each inbound Harpy UAV in the model. This 
alternative assumes that the ship’s UAV, the Fire Scout, would use its onboard sensors to 
detect enemy UAVs, so it also causes the long range probability of detect to increase by 
0.1 in the model. Adding this alternative to the baseline model results in a 26.4 percent 
decrease of average UAV hits scored on the DDG.  
 
 




3. Fire Scout Modeling Results 
Figure 28 displays the Fire Scout alternative compared to the baseline model for a 
swarm of eight UAVs attacking a DDG. The Fire Scout’s onboard weapons are assumed 
to be about as effective as the small arms mounts on the DDG. Given that the baseline 
small arms have a limited firing window as the UAVs close with the ship, the implemen-
tation of the Fire Scout alternative in the model lengthens that firing window by doubling 
the number of opportunities for shooting down UAVs at short and medium ranges. Due 
to its onboard sensor capabilities, the Fire Scout also causes the long range probability of 
detect to increase by 0.1 in the model. Based on the model, the Fire Scout is one of the 
unfavorable implementations, as it has minimal impact through modeling results. Adding 
this alternative to the baseline model results in a 2.1 percent decrease in average UAV 
hits scored on the DDG. 
 
 




4.  Additional CIWS Modeling Results 
Figure 29 displays the additional CIWS alternative compared to the baseline 
model for a swarm of eight UAVs attacking a DDG. Because in the DRM the incoming 
UAVs attack the front of the DDG, only one CIWS can fire at the UAVs for the baseline 
DDG. Assuming that two CIWS mounts can fire at the UAVs simultaneously in this al-
ternative, the model implementation of additional CIWS mounts doubles the number of 
opportunities for shooting down UAVs with the CIWS at long and medium ranges. Based 
on the model, the CIWS is one of the favorable implementations as it has significant im-
pact through modeling results. Adding this alternative to the baseline model results in a 
34.5 percent decrease in the number of average UAV hits scored on the DDG.  
 
 
Figure 29: Additional CIWS Alternative Results 
 
5. Additional Small Arms Modeling Results 
Figure 30 displays the additional small arms alternative compared to the baseline 
model for a swarm of eight UAVs attacking a DDG. The implementation of additional 
small arms improves the baseline model by doubling the number opportunities for shoot-
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ing down UAVs with the small arms at short and medium ranges. Based on the model, 
the additional small arms is an unfavorable implementation, as it has minimal impact as 
indicated by modeling results. Adding this alternative to the baseline model results in a 
4.0 percent decrease of average UAV hits scored on the DDG.  
 
Figure 30: Additional Small Arms Alternative Results 
 
6. Electronic Warfare (EW) Jamming Modeling Results 
Figure 31 displays the electronic warfare jamming alternative compared to the 
baseline model for a swarm of eight UAVs attacking a DDG. This alternative is capable 
of having a 360 degree bubble of coverage which defeats multiple RC UAV threats by 
disrupting communication signals. Because the DDG would activate its jamming field 
before its approach to port, it has the capability to engage multiple RC UAVs, including 
ones that have not yet been detected. The jammer in the model has a 0.7 chance of dis-
rupting each inbound RC UAV’s control enough to cause it to miss the DDG. When the 
electronic warfare jamming alternative is added, there is some overlap between the tar-
gets it affects and the targets shot down by the small arms, because the small arms opera-
tors do not know which RC UAVs have been successfully jammed. Based on the model, 
the electronic warfare jamming alternative is one of the favorable implementations, as it 
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has significant impact as indicated in the modeling results. Adding this alternative to the 




Figure 31: Electronic Warfare Jamming Alternative Results 
 
7. Ship Based Radar Decoy Modeling Results 
Figure 32 displays the ship-launched radar decoy alternative compared to the 
baseline model for a swarm of eight UAVs attacking a DDG. The implementation of the 
ship radar decoy improves the baseline model by increasing the amount of UAVs de-
stroyed at short range. Because the ship would launch multiple radar decoys once a Har-
py UAV is detected at short range, it has the capability to engage multiple Harpy UAVs, 
including ones that have not yet been detected. Provided at least one Harpy UAV is de-
tected and survives the medium-range defensive systems, the radar decoy has a 0.4 
chance of seducing each inbound Harpy UAV in the model. Adding this alternative to the 
baseline model results in a 20.0 percent decrease of the average UAV hits scored on the 
DDG.  




Figure 32: Ship Based Radar Decoy Alternative Results 
 
8. Smokescreen Modeling Results 
Figure 33 displays the smokescreen alternative compared to the baseline model 
for a swarm of eight UAVs attacking a DDG. The implementation of the smokescreen 
improves the baseline model by reducing the probability of RC UAVs being able to col-
lide with the ship. Since the RC UAVs are being guided visually from afar, executing this 
alternative would make it difficult for the operator to successfully guide the RC UAV to 
impact the DDG. Provided that at least one UAV is detected at short range, the 
smokescreen in the model has a 0.5 chance of causing each incoming RC UAV to miss 
the ship. Because the smoke would also interfere with target tracking for the DDG’s 
small arms, this alternative causes the short range small arms accuracy to be reduced 
from 0.15 to 0.05 in the model. Adding this alternative to the baseline model results in a 





Figure 33: Smokescreen Alternative Results 
 
9. Modeling Results Summary 
To compare each alternative to the baseline model, the average number of “UAV 
Hits” was calculated from the results. In the model, “UAV Hits” are described as UAVs 
that were either undetected, unsuccessfully neutralized, or a combination of both that also 
successfully collide with the ship. Average results of 500 simulations were recorded to 
compare the baseline model with each alternative. Table 38 assesses the “Baseline Aver-
age UAV Hits” and each “Alternative Average UAV Hits” for the model. These two var-
iables are utilized to calculate the percent decrease for each alternative. For example, EW 
RC Jamming yields a total of 32.7 percent decrease from the original baseline model.  
 








Baseline 3.82 0.0 1.47 
EW RC Jamming 2.57 32.7 1.2 
Additional CIWS 2.5 34.5 1.34 
Ship Radar Decoy 3.05 20.0 1.4 










UAV Radar Decoy 2.81 26.4 1.47 
LaWS 3.76 1.3 1.46 
Additional Small Arms 3.62 4.0 1.45 
Fire Scout 3.73 2.1 1.5 
 
B. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
The purpose of the cost benefit analysis is to rank the alternatives by their cost ef-
fectiveness to find the best alternatives for protecting the DDG against UAV swarm at-
tacks. The cost benefit analysis is a process starting with obtaining the required infor-
mation, and ending with ranking the alternatives to find the ones with the highest cost 
effectiveness, as shown in Figure 34: Cost Benefit Analysis Process. 
 
 
Figure 34: Cost Benefit Analysis Process 
 
Computing alternatives’ cost benefit is the key step in the cost benefit analysis 
process. For each alternative, it involves finding the improvement in model effectiveness 
divided by the cost of that alternative. Effectiveness is measured for both the baseline and 
each alternative by the number of UAV hits scored on the DDG as obtained from an av-
erage of 500 runs in the simulation model. The improvement of average number of UAV 
hits scored on the DDG is determined by computing the difference between the baseline 




𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝐴𝑉 ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝐴𝑉 ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠 –  𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝐴𝑉 ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠  
 
With the alternatives’ cost estimates obtained from alternative section, the cost 
benefit for each alternative is computed by dividing the improvement of average number 
of UAV hits by the cost estimate, as shown in Equation 2. The higher result indicates the 
better cost benefit and higher ranking.    
Equation 2 
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝐴𝑉 ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒  
 
Table 39 shows the summary of the alternatives as discussed in the Alternatives 
Sections and the results from the simulation model. Based on the alternative capabilities, 
some of the alternatives can only be effective against only either RC UAVs or the Harpy. 
The RC UAV Jamming EW and the Smoke Screen are only effective against the RC 
UAVs. The ship radar decoy and the UAV radar decoy are only effective against the 
Harpy. The RC UAV jamming EW, the smoke screen, the ship radar decoy, and the UAV 
radar decoy are also categorized as non-lethal or soft-kill weapon systems. These non-
lethal or soft-kill weapon systems are used to neutralize the UAVs and to divert the im-
pact of UAV attacks from the DDG. On the other hand, the other alternatives such as 
CIWS, LaWS, small arms mounts, and the Fire Scout with APKWS are effective against 
the RC UAVs and the Harpy. These alternatives are categorized as lethal or hard-kill 
weapon systems. These lethal or hard-kill weapon systems destroy or eliminate the UAVs 
before their impact could cause any structural damage to the DDG or casualties in its 
crew. Most of the alternatives have medium effective ranges against UAV swarm attacks 
except the Small Arms Mounts Alternative, Ship-Based Radar Decoy, and the Smoke 
Screen Alternative, which have short effective ranges, and the UAV-Launched Radar 
Decoy, which is effective at long range. 
 







 Cost per 
DDG($M) 







Baseline $0 $0.0 Medium RC UAV 
and Harpy 
Hard 3.82 
CIWS $816 $13.2 Medium RC UAV 
and Harpy 
Hard 2.50 
EW: RC Jammer $1,028 $16.6 Medium RC UAV Soft 2.57 
Fire Scout/APKWS $2,121 $34.2 Medium RC UAV 
and Harpy 
Hard 3.73 





$1,018 $16.4 Short Harpy Soft 3.05 
Small Arms Mounts $362 $5.8 Short RC UAV 
and Harpy 
Hard 3.66 
Smoke Screen $2,014 $32.5 Short RC UAV Soft 3.24 
Fire Scout/Radar De-
coy 
$2,218 $35.8 Long Harpy Soft 2.81 
 
As the results from the simulation model show, the CIWS alternative (which dou-
bles the number of CIWS mounts) has the smallest UAVs hits with 2.5, and the RC UAV 
jamming alternative has nearly identical results, with 2.56 hits scored on the DDG. The 
LaWS alternative has the highest UAVs hits of 3.76 and is joined by the Fire Scout with 
APKWS alternative (3.73 hits) and the additional small arms mounts alternative (3.66 
hits) in having very little reduction in hits from the baseline (3.81 hits). However, the re-
sults from the cost benefits analysis process would determine which alternative would be 
the choice for implementation in terms of reduction of UAVs hits per million dollars 
spent. Table 40 is the summary of the results from the cost benefit analysis. Applying the 
cost benefit process as described earlier, the CIWS Alternative, the RC UAV Jamming 
EW, and the Ship-Based Radar Decoy Alternative are the top three most cost effective. 
Meanwhile, the LaWS, the smoke screen and the Fire Scout with APKWS System Alter-





























Baseline 3.82 0.00 $0 $0.0 NA NA 
CIWS 2.50 1.32 $816 $13.2 0.100 1 
EW: RC Jammer 2.57 1.25 $1,028 $16.6 0.075 2 
Ship-Based Radar Decoy 3.05 0.76 $1,018 $16.4 0.046 3 
Fire Scout/Radar Decoy 2.81 1.01 $2,218 $35.8 0.028 4 
Small Arms Mounts  3.66 0.15 $362 $5.8 0.026 5 
Smoke Screen  3.24 0.57 $2,014 $32.5 0.018 6 
Fire Scout/APKWS 3.73 0.08 $2,121 $34.2 0.002 7 
LAWS 3.77 0.05 $2,379 $38.4 0.001 8 
 
However, each alternative has its own limitations. The RC UAV Jamming EW 
has medium effective range and is only effective against RC UAVs. However, the RC 
UAV Jamming EW requires no reloading, which provides constant protection against 
UAVs. The ship-based radar decoy is only effective against the Harpy, not the RC UAV. 
The CIWS has a large footprint, which means it requires significant space for integrating 
additional units on the DDG. The small arms mounts has short effective ranges and poor 
accuracy. The UAV-launched radar decoy can only be implemented when the ship al-
ready has its own UAV, which leads to high cost for implementation; the cost for this al-
ternative in Table 40: Summary of Cost Benefit Analysis for Individual Alternatives in-
cludes the cost for the Fire Scout in addition to the decoy launcher integration. The LaWS 
and Fire Scout with APKWS system are the least effective against UAVs and expensive 
to implement. Moreover, the small arms mounts, the ship-based radar decoy and CIWS 
require reloading between usages. Therefore, the combination of the alternatives would 
be essential to fill the capability gaps of the individual alternatives. 
The top three cost effective alternatives were chosen for the combinations. These 
were chosen because they had the highest cost benefit of the 8 alternatives. Their capabil-
ities can mutually fill in the capability gaps. Particularly, the combination of the RC UAV 
Jamming EW and the ship-based radar would provide full DDG protection against RC 
UAVs and the Harpy. Table 41 shows the results of the combinations. Although there are 
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only 4 combinations in Table 41, there are 7 entries to show the individual results com-
paratively. The top three combinations, based on marginal benefit, are actually not all 
combinations. Coming in at Number 1 is the CIWS by itself. Number 2 is the combina-
tion of CIWS and EW. Number 3 is EW by itself. The reason that the marginal benefit 
for the combination of CIWS and EW is better than the EW by itself is because the CIWS 
has such a high marginal benefit compared to EW. 























Baseline 3.82 0.00 $0 $0.0 NA NA 
CIWS 2.50 1.32 $816 $13.2 0.100 1 
CIWS + EW: RC 
Jammer 
1.56 2.25 $1,844 $29.7 0.076 2 
EW: RC Jammer 2.57 1.25 $1,028 $16.6 0.075 3 
EW: RC Jammer + 
Ship decoy 
1.69 2.13 $2,046 $33.0 0.064 4 
CIWS + Ship decoy 2.01 1.80 $1,834 $29.6 0.061 5 
CIWS + EW: RC 
Jammer+ Ship-
Based Radar Decoy 
1.12 2.70 $2,862 $46.2 0.058 6 
Ship-Based Radar 
Decoy 
3.05 0.76 $1,018 $16.4 0.046 7 
 
Figure 35 is a scatter plot that shows the individual alternatives’ average number 
of hits scored on the DDG versus cost based on the 8 inbound UAVs over the 500 simu-
lation runs. The best alternative for the money would be the CIWS, given that it has the 
highest reduction in hits scored on the DDG per dollar. Looking at the plot, the Small 
Arms Mounts alternative barely improves the number of hits from the baseline (3.82 ver-
sus 3.66, for a difference of 0.15), so is not worth consideration. The CIWS, EW, and 
Ship-Based Radar Decoy alternatives are in the lower left-hand corner of the remaining 
alternatives. Of these, the CIWS has fewer resulting hits and costs the least. The EW al-
ternative results in the lowest number of hits after the CIWS, and has close to the same 
cost as the Ship-Based Radar Decoy. The Ship-Based Radar Decoy has slightly worse 
performance (with a higher number of hits) than the next best Fire Scout-Launched Radar 
Decoy, but costs far less than it and the other remaining alternatives. This scatter plot was 




Figure 35: Cost per DDG vs. Number of Hits for Individual Alternatives 
 
Figure 36 shows the same as Figure 35 but for the combinations of alternatives. 
The results are a lot more linear here, with better performance as more money is spent, 
making it more difficult to narrow exactly what configuration would be best for the 
DDG. It will ultimately come down to how much funding is available to spend on the 
DDG upgrade. Because each of the three alternatives under consideration have approxi-
mately the same cost ($13.2 million U.S. dollars to $16.6 million U.S. dollars per DDG), 
the decision first depends upon how many alternatives fit within the budget. With a single 
upgrade to the DDG fleet, the CIWS makes the most sense, reducing the number of UAV 
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are available for two upgrades, the combination of the CIWS and EW Jammer upgrades 
is most cost effective, reducing the UAV hits to 1.56 for a total cost of $1844 million 
U.S. dollars ($29.7 million U.S. dollars per DDG). If additional funding is allocated to-
ward improving UAV defense, then it makes sense to upgrade the DDG with the CIWS, 
EW Jammer, and Ship-Based Radar Decoy alternatives, reducing the UAV hits to 1.12 
for a total cost of $2862 million U.S. dollars ($46.2 million U.S. dollars per DDG). 
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The recommendation also depends on factors other than available funds. The cost 
estimate assumed that the ship-launched radar decoy would require its own launcher ra-
ther than being able to make use of the DDG’s existing decoy launchers. If it could make 
use of the DDG’s existing launchers, or if existing decoys could be modified to be effec-
tive against the Harpy UAV, then this would lower the price of that alternative signifi-
cantly, making it even more attractive. Similarly, if DDGs obtain their own UAVs, such 
as the Fire Scout, to fulfill some other mission need, then it could be a cheap, effective 























VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objectives of this project were to analyze the current USN destroyer baseline 
capabilities for defending against UAVs, identify the capability gaps, generate alterna-
tives for UAV defense, and use systems engineering techniques to determine the most 
cost-effective options for defending against UAV threats. 
In this report, it was discussed that a DDG may be threatened by a swarm of 
UAVs acting as IEDs, while operating in a littoral setting on a mission to assist expedi-
tionary strike groups. This report assessed how well the current combat systems of the 
DDG can defend the ship against a swarm of UAVs. It was concluded that when attacked 
by a swarm of 8 UAVs, the most probable outcome was that four UAVs were able to im-
pact the ship, thus concluding that the DDG is not able to adequately defend against a 
swarm of UAVs. In order to determine what factors would assist in the DDG’s defensive 
capabilities, a sensitivity analysis was performed. The sensitivity analysis demonstrated 
that improving the sensors is not as effective as making weapon system improvements.  
In concurrence with the results of the sensitivity analysis, system alternatives fo-
cused on neutralizing UAVs were identified. The alternatives identified were assessed 
based on cost, risk, and model improvements. It was concluded from this analysis that 
adding additional CIWS mounts, incorporating an electronic warfare jammer, and in-
stalling radar decoy launchers on the DDG are the most cost effective alternatives. These 
alternatives work well together in combinations and when examined via modeling, their 
use indicates they would reduce the modeled number of UAV hits on the DDG as addi-
tional alternatives are installed.  
There are many opportunities for further research in the area of UAV swarm de-
fense. During the research for the current scenario, the modeling activities conducted by 
the team generated mostly top level ideas rather than precise predictions, and this could 
be improved through several model modifications. First, due to the classification of in-
formation concerning DDG capabilities, the model could be run in a classified environ-
ment using classified numbers for inputs such as probability of detection for sensor sys-
tems and probability of kill for weapon systems. The model could also be tailored for a 
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specific type of UAV, based on the threat assessment for a specific region. Instead of 
considering all DDG sensor systems as a whole, the model could provide increased gran-
ularity by modeling each sensor system individually; rather than just providing the total 
number of detections at a given range, the improved model could provide the number of 
detections by each detection system. Finally, the model could incorporate battle damage 
for both hits to the incoming UAVs by the DDG and the hits scored on the DDG by the 
UAVs. The model could thus show how hits from different weapon systems would have 
different probabilities of shooting down the UAVs, how different types of UAVs could 
better withstand hits, and how the number of UAV hits required to seriously damage or 
sink a DDG depends on the size of the UAV’s explosive payload. 
Because this project involved a fairly specific scenario, further research could in-
volve broadening the scenario. The scenario could include the threat of UAV attack 
swarms carrying missiles rather than the suicide IED threat examined in this project. The 
scenario could also consider a broader range of factors such as weather, number of 
friendly ships nearby, and location; a DDG in port and a DDG in open water would have 
different defensive systems available.  
Once an alternative is selected for more detailed investigation, user feedback 
would provide more pertinent information regarding the refinement of the suitability 
risks. Alternatives could also benefit from more refined cost estimates. Prototype testing 
could validate an alternative’s performance in the model, and lower the risk of imple-
menting that alternative on a DDG. 
The results of this report may be limited in their application. For example, several 
limiting assumptions had to be made accommodate for the use of unclassified infor-
mation on the threat and on the DDG’s capabilities. However, if the proper inputs are ap-
plied, then the process and techniques utilized in this project, including the model file it-
self, can be used to guide a more in-depth analysis. It is hoped that by doing a more in-
depth analysis, the most economical solution can be found in order to protect the DDG 




APPENDIX A - TEAM ORGANIZATION 
A-1 TEAM ORGANIZATION 
The Crane Team is formed by eight students. Table A-42 contains a list of the 
names and contact information for the eight team members. All members of the team are 
collocated at NAVSEA Crane and are enrolled in the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
Masters of Science in Systems Engineering (MSSE) program.  
Table A-42: Team Crane Members 
Name Work Telephone Work E-mail 
Balbuena, Demostenes (812) 854–6150 demostenes.balbuena@navy.mil 
Casserly, Michael (812) 863–3117 michael.j.casserly@saic.com 
Dickerson, Brandon (812) 854–4877 brandon.dickerson@navy.mil 
Graves, Stephen (812) 854–8325 stephen.j.graves@navy.mil 
Maldonado, Vince (812) 854–1460 vicente.maldonado@navy.mil 
Pandya, Bhavisha (812) 854–1555 bhavisha.pandya@navy.mil 
Pham, Loc (812) 854–6261 loc.pham@navy.mil 
Sanders, James (812) 854–1030 james.sanders2@navy.mil 
 
A-2 TEAM STRUCTURE 
The team organization, as shown in Figure A-37, consists of six integrated prod-
uct teams (IPTs) along with a project lead, deputy project lead, and configuration manag-
er. The IPTs include the Stakeholder Advocate Team, Need Analysis and Research 
Team, Systems Architecture Team, Modeling and Design Team, Analysis Team, and De-
liverable Review Team. IPTs were chosen in order to maintain tasking flexibility and to 
promote teamwork. Not all of the IPTs are in existence throughout the duration of the 
project. The IPTs were created when the need arose and members of the IPT gradually 
joined other IPTs as tasking was completed. In this way, flexibility was maintained by 
increasing or decreasing the number of members on each team in order to meet the 
scheduled deliverables outlined in the Integrated Master Schedule (IMS). However, in 
order to accommodate for an iterative process throughout the project, at least one team 
member was responsible for maintaining and updating previous deliverables of all IPTs. 
Because team members are a part of a small team throughout the duration of the project, 
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effective communication and relationships were established, promoting teamwork. Re-
sponsibilities held by the positions outlined in Figure A-34: Team Organization is de-
scribed below. Figure A-38 is a qualitative representation of when the IPTs are formed 
and disbanded with respect to each other. 
 
 
Figure A-37: Team Organization 
 
 





A-2.1 PROJECT LEAD 
The project lead is primarily responsible for developing an Integrated Master 
Scheduled (IMS) and directing all team activities for the duration of the project. In addi-
tion, the project lead is responsible for leading team meetings. 
 
A-2.2 DEPUTY PROJECT LEAD 
The Deputy Project Lead assists the Project Lead in his duties. In addition, the 
Deputy Project Lead is responsible for developing the team organization and assessing 
that there is a proper work distribution among the organization in order to promote work 
efficiency and compliance with the IMS. The Deputy Project Lead also schedules team 
meetings. 
 
A-2.3 CONFIGURATION MANAGER 
The configuration manager is responsible for maintaining the format and structure 
of the final report. Some of these responsibilities include maintaining a table of contents, 
ensuring proper number of tables and figures, assisting in integrating individual sections 
into the overall report, maintaining a list of references, and other tasks as needed.  
 
A-2.4 STAKEHOLDER ADVOCATE TEAM 
The Stakeholder Advocate Team is in existence for the entire duration of the pro-
ject. At the start of the project, the team is responsible for identifying all stakeholders in-
volved, conducting stakeholder interviews, and documenting the stakeholders’ needs and 
concerns which will be utilized by the other IPTs. The Stakeholder Advocate Team uses 
their analysis and input from the Needs Analysis and Research Team to translate the 
Stakeholder’s need into a collection of system requirements. Members of the Stakeholder 
Advocate Team may join other IPTs; however, at least one team member remains on the 
Stakeholder Advocate Team for the duration of the project and is responsible for estab-
lishing and maintaining communication with the stakeholders. The Stakeholder Advocate 
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Team is required to document their findings and produce applicable deliverables for use 
in the final report. 
 
A-2.5 NEEDS ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH TEAM 
The Needs Analysis and Research Team is created at the start of the project, but is 
reduced as team members are required for tasking on other IPTs. The main responsibili-
ties of the Needs Analysis and Research Team are to clearly define the user need and es-
tablish the scope of the project. The Needs Analysis and Research Team accomplishes 
these responsibilities by utilizing input from the Stakeholder Advocate Team, researching 
current capabilities, and establishing the design reference mission (DRM). The Needs 
Analysis and Research Team is required to document their findings and produce applica-
ble deliverables for use in the final report. At least one previous member of the Needs 
Analysis and Research Team is responsible for updating the deliverables as needed 
throughout the duration of the project. 
 
A-2.6 SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE TEAM 
The Systems Architecture Team is created when the need and scope of the project 
has been identified by the Needs Analysis and Research Team. The Systems Architecture 
Team is responsible for developing the applicable architectural views, generating and 
maintaining requirements, and ensuring traceability of requirements. The Systems Archi-
tecture Team utilizes the research conducted by the Needs Analysis and Research Team, 
ensures compliance with Stakeholders through the input of the Stakeholder Advocate 
Team, and maintains a working relationship with the Modeling and Design Team. The 
Systems Architecture Team is required to document their findings and produce applicable 
deliverables for use in the final report. At least one previous member of the Systems Ar-
chitecture Team is responsible for updating the deliverables as needed throughout the du-




A-2.7 MODELING AND DESIGN TEAM 
The Modeling and Design Team is created concurrently with the Systems Archi-
tecture Team. The Modeling and Design Team works closely with the Systems Architec-
ture Team in order to assist in requirements generation by modeling the threat scenarios 
defined by the Needs Analysis and Research Team. In addition, the Modeling and Design 
Team uses inputs from the Needs Analysis and Research Team to identify a capability 
gap and to design potential solutions. The Modeling and Design Team is required to doc-
ument their findings and produce applicable deliverables for use in the final report. At 
least one previous member of the Modeling and Design Team is responsible for updating 
the deliverables as needed throughout the duration of the project. 
 
A-2.8 ANALYSIS TEAM 
The Analysis Team assesses the solutions identified by the Modeling and Design 
Team for their respective costs, associated risks, and effectiveness against the UAV threat 
(resulting from the Modeling and Design Team’s model), verifying that the established 
requirements have been met. The Analysis Team then takes input from the Stakeholder 
Advocate Team to recommend which solutions may or may not be feasible and verify 
that the stakeholders’ needs have been met. The Cost and Risk Analysis Team is required 
to document their findings and produce applicable deliverables for use in the final report. 
At least one previous member of the Cost and Risk Analysis Team is responsible for up-
dating the deliverables as needed throughout the duration of the project. 
 
A-2.9 DELIVERABLE REVIEW TEAM 
The Deliverable Review Team is responsible for reviewing and editing all deliv-
erables to ensure proper grammar has been used and that the content is consistent with all 










Systems Architecture Team Lead, Stakeholder Advocate Team 
Member 
Casserly, Michael Project Lead, Deliverable Review Team Lead, Stakeholder Ad-
vocate Team Member, Modeling and Design Team Member 
Dickerson, Brandon Systems Architecture Team Member, Need Analysis and Re-
search Team Member, Deliverable Review Team Member 
Graves, Stephen Deputy Project Lead, Need Analysis and Research Team Lead,  
Systems Architecture Team Member 
Maldonado, Vince Modeling and Design Team Lead, Need Analysis and Research 
Team Member 
Pandya, Bhavisha Analysis Team Lead, Need Analysis and Research Team 
Pham, Loc Stakeholder Advocate Team Lead, Analysis Team Member 
James Sanders Configuration Manager, Stakeholder Advocate Team Member,  





APPENDIX B - SCHEDULES AND MILESTONES 
A timeframe of three quarters are specified for the completion of the capstone 
project. During this time the group has specific tasks and duties to complete associated 
with the project. Important milestones have been developed by the group for optimal effi-
ciency and time management. The first major milestone is the Project Plan which consists 
of the team organization, stakeholders, Systems Engineering process, and other prelimi-
nary project topics. The next major milestones consist of the first and second drafts. The-
se allow the group to create and update the document which becomes the final report. The 
final report is the culmination of all of the completed work and the final presentation is 
created from the final report. Figure B-39 shows the Gantt chart specifying all the im-
portant milestones and their associated dates. 
 
 








APPENDIX C - SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
 












Figure C-43: OV-5 IDEF0 Counter Target (Level 2) 
120 
 
APPENDIX D - SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
Table D-44: System Requirements 
Section Item Description Type Refined by Specifies 
1 Required Capabil-
ity 
Onboard Destroyer Protection System (ODPS) provides com-
manders with dynamic situational awareness (SA) and destroy-
er protection from UAV swarm attacks.  
Capability 
Gap 
  Function  1 Protect 
AEGIS Destroyer 
from a UAV Threat  
1.1 Threat detection The ODPS requires a layered network of radars, and sensors 
capabilities enabling persistent, all weather, multi-discipline 
situational awareness to enhance the Commander’s situation 
awareness (SA) and to provide threat information for threat 
identification and threat engagement. The ODPS will be capa-
ble to detect threats with large radar cross section (RCS), small 
RCS, and deceptive radar threats (stealth). 





1.1.1 Radar Cross Sec-
tion (RCS) 
The ODPS detection system shall be able to detect UAVs with 
a RCS greater than 0.5 m^2. 
Capability 
Gap 
  Function  1 Protect 
AEGIS Destroyer 
from a UAV Threat 
Function  1.1 De-
tect UAV Swarm 
Function  1.3 Track 
Target  
1.1.2 Range The ODPS detection system shall be able to detect threats at X 
meters (m) with probability of X%. 
Capability 
Gap 
  Function  1.1 De-
tect UAV Swarm 
Function  1.1.1 
CIWS Detect Func-




Section Item Description Type Refined by Specifies 
1.1.3 Detection Altitude The ODPS detection system shall be able to detect threats from 
the water surface up to an altitude of 3,000 meters. 
nil   Function  1.1 De-
tect UAV Swarm 
Function  1.3.1 
Computer Tracking 
System  
1.1.4 Treat Speed The ODPS detection system shall be able to detect UAVs fly-
ing from X Km per hour (km/h) to 250 km/h. 
Capability 
Gap 
  Function  1.1 De-
tect UAV Swarm 
Function  1.3 Track 
Target  
1.1.5 Spectrum The ODPS detection system shall be able to detect the threat 
data link in full spectrum with frequency ranging from 0MHz 
to 25,000MHz*. 
nil   Function  1.3.1 
Computer Tracking 
System  
1.1.6 Threat Detection 
Location 
The ODPS detection system shall be able to locate the direc-
tion of attacks with respect to the DDG location. 
nil   Function  1.1.3 
Lookout Detect 
Function  1.2 Pri-
oritize Target Func-
tion  1.3 Track Tar-
get Function  1.3.1 
Computer Tracking 
System  
1.1.7 Number of threats 
detection 
The ODPS detection system shall be able to detect up to 10 
threats in real time. 
Capability 
Gap 
  Function  1.1 De-
tect UAV Swarm  
1.2 Threat identifica-
tion 
The ODPS will assist in the conduct of threat identification by 
facilitating real time spectrum data in target identification 
through the differentiation between friend and foe, combat 
identification, and/or positive identification. The ODPS also 
supports precision lethal, nonlethal, and cooperative engage-
ment through automated dissemination and enhanced data dis-
tribution under the severest conditions in full spectrum opera-
tions.  
nil     
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Section Item Description Type Refined by Specifies 
1.2.1 Friend or Foe Iden-
tification 
The ODPS identification system shall be able to identify detec-
tion UAVs as small cross section aerial vehicles at X meters 
(m) with probability of X%. 
nil   Function  1.1 De-
tect UAV Swarm 
Function  1.3 Track 
Target Function  
1.3.1 Computer 
Tracking System  
1.2.2 ID Information The ODPS identification system shall provide all near real-
time targets’ ID information as: GPS location. Velocity. Dis-
tance to DDG. Direction of movement. 
nil   Function  1.3.1 
Computer Tracking 
System  
1.3 Protection The ODPS will enable 180 degree spherical protection umbrel-
la from current and future threats by detecting, identifying, and 
lethal and nonlethal engagement.  
nil     
1.3.1 Presetting com-
mand 
The ODPS C&D subsystem shall allow users to enter mission 
doctrine statement to dictate autonomous responses to given 
specified stimuli. 
nil   Function  1.4 En-
gage Threat Func-
tion  1.4.2 Small 
Arms Engage  
1.3.1.1 Presetting Com-
mand 
The ODPS C&D subsystem shall allow users to enter mission 




    
1.3.1.2 Threat Tracking The ODPS C&D subsystem shall be able to create, manage, 
and display the threat tracking information. 
nil   Function  1.3 Track 
Target Function  
1.3.1 Computer 
Tracking System  
1.3.1.3 Threat Evaluation The ODPS C&D shall be able to evaluate the priority of threat 
in order to assist the DDG command in making decision to 
assign appropriate method of engagement. 
Capability 
Gap 
  Function  1.2 Pri-
oritize Target Func-
tion  1.2.1 Distance 
Prioritization Func-
tion  1.3 Track Tar-





Section Item Description Type Refined by Specifies 
1.3.1.4 DDG Weapon As-
signment 
  Capability 
Gap 
    
1.3.1.5 Command and 
Control (C2) Inter-
face 
The ODPS C&D subsystem shall be able to interface with the 
current C2 system. 
nil   Function  1.3.1 
Computer Tracking 
System Function  
1.4 Engage Threat  
1.3.2.1 Display Infor-
mation 
The ODPS display system shall provide the DDG command 




    
1.3.2.2 Display resolution The ODPS display system shall have color display resolution 
at the quality of 1080p HD quality. 
Capability 
Gap 
    
1.4 Threat Engage-
ment 
The ODPS will have the capability of lethal engagement, and 
nonlethal engagement to eliminate threats. The lethal engage-
ment is the usage of lethal weapon system such as missiles, 
and gun systems. The nonlethal engagement is the usage of 
electronic attack (EA) system such as jammer. 
nil     




    
1.4.2 Probability of Kill The ODPS shall have a probability of kill of X% at X meters. nil   Function  1 Protect 
AEGIS Destroyer 
from a UAV Threat 
Function  1.4 En-
gage Threat Func-
tion  1.4.2 Small 
Arms Engage Func-




Section Item Description Type Refined by Specifies 
1.4.3 Engagement 
Method 
The ODPS shall have lethal (weapon systems) and nonlethal 
(Electronic Attack) mean of engagement. 
nil   Function  1.4 En-
gage Threat Func-
tion  1.4.1 CIWS 
Engage Function  
1.4.2 Small Arms 





ODPS enhance commanders’ situational awareness by provid-
ing near-real-time relevant information within a collaborative 
C2 environment based on federated data standards and schema, 
an open architecture, and common control standards. Com-
manders should also have the flexibility to selectively extend 
network transport connectivity to units or battle space via 
ODPS situation awareness (SA). This network extension capa-
bility enables information and knowledge connectivity to the 
tactical edge while operating in degraded or interrupted net-
work environments. 
nil     
1.5 Operational Envi-
ronment 
The system shall meet the requirements of the following envi-
ronmental test criteria as outlined in MIL-STD-810G: 
Capability 
Gap 
  Function  1 Protect 
AEGIS Destroyer 
from a UAV Threat  
1.5.1 Operational Tem-
perature 
The ODPS system shall be operable without degradation to 
specified system performance throughout the temperature 
range of -20ºC to +60ºC to meet the MIL-STD-810G Method 
501.5 (high temperature) and the MIL-STD-810G Method 
502.5 (low temperature). 
Capability 
Gap 
    
1.5.2 Storage Tempera-
ture 
The ODPS system shall meet the requirements of this specifi-
cation after prolonged non-operating storage at any tempera-
ture within the range of -28ºF (-33ºC) to+160ºF (+71ºC) to 
meet the MIL-STD-810G Method 501.5 (high temperature) 
and the MIL-STD-810G Method 502.5 (low temperature). 
Capability 
Gap 
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Section Item Description Type Refined by Specifies 
1.5.3 Humidity The ODPS system shall initialize and operate when exposed to 
humidity levels typical of the required operational environment 
to which the system will be subjected to meet the MIL-STD-
810G Method 507.5. 
nil     
1.5.4 Salt Fog The system shall have the resistance to the effects of a salt at-
mosphere primarily to meet the MIL-STD-810G Method 
509.5. 
nil     
1.5.5 Rain and Blowing 
Rain 
The system shall initialize and operate during and after expo-
sure to rain and blowing rain to meet the MIL-STD-810G 
Method 506.5. 
nil     
1.5.6 Low Pressure (Al-
titude) 
The system shall be transportable (non-operating) in military 
aircraft at altitudes of up to 40,000 feet to meet the MIL-STD-
810G Method 500.5 
Capability 
Gap 
    
1.5.7 Shock The system, in its intended mounted operational configuration, 
shall be subjected to the shock profiles of tactical environment. 
In transport mode, the system shall be subjected to the shocks 
encountered in transportation. The system shall meet the MIL-
STD-810G Method 516.6 
Capability 
Gap 
    
1.5.8 Vibration The system shall be subjected to the vibration to meet the MIL-
STD-810G Method 514.6. 
Capability 
Gap 
    
1.5.9 Icing/Freezing 
Rain 
The system shall be subjected to ice buildup due to rain, driz-
zle, fog or splash to meet the MIL-STD-810G Method 521.3. 
Capability 
Gap 
    
1.5.10 Ballistic Shock The system shall be subjected to the ballistic shock to meet the 
MIL-STD-810G Method 522.1 
Capability 
Gap 
    
1.6 Sustainment The ODPS must conduct or support sustainment tasks, func-
tions, and missions of: supply, distribution, and services, from 
home station to forward deployed locations, including the sea 
base.  




The ODPS system shall have the operational availability (Ao) 
of X% 
nil   Function  1 Protect 
AEGIS Destroyer 
from a UAV Threat  
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APPENDIX E - TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVEL DESCRIPTION 
Table E-45: TRL Descriptions (From (ASD(R&E)) 2011) 
TRL  Definition  Description  Supporting Information  
1 Basic principles 
observed and re-
ported.  
Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research 
begins to be translated into applied research and devel-
opment (R&D). Examples might include paper studies of 
a technology’s basic properties.  
Published research that identifies the principles that underlie this 
technology. References to who, where, when.  
2 Technology concept 
and/or application 
formulated.  
Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, 
practical applications can be invented. Applications are 
speculative, and there may be no proof or detailed analy-
sis to support the assumptions. Examples are limited to 
analytic studies.  
Publications or other references that outline the application be-
ing considered and that provide analysis to support the concept.  




of concept.  
Active R&D is initiated. This includes analytical studies 
and laboratory studies to physically validate the analyti-
cal predictions of separate elements of the technology. 
Examples include components that are not yet integrated 
or representative.  
Results of laboratory tests performed to measure parameters of 
interest and comparison to analytical predictions for critical sub-
systems. References to who, where, and when these tests and 
comparisons were performed.  
4 Component and/or 
breadboard valida-
tion in a laboratory 
environment.  
Basic technological components are integrated to estab-
lish that they will work together. This is relatively “low 
fidelity” compared with the eventual system. Examples 
include integration of “ad hoc” hardware in the laborato-
ry.  
System concepts that have been considered and results from 
testing laboratory-scale breadboard(s). References to who did 
this work and when. Provide an estimate of how breadboard 
hardware and test results differ from the expected system goals.  
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TRL  Definition  Description  Supporting Information  
5 Component and/or 
breadboard valida-
tion in a relevant 
environment.  
Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. 
The basic technological components are integrated with 
reasonably realistic supporting elements so they can be 
tested in a simulated environment. Examples include 
“high-fidelity” laboratory integration of components.  
Results from testing laboratory breadboard system are integrated 
with other supporting elements in a simulated operational envi-
ronment. How does the “relevant environment” differ from the 
expected operational environment? How do the test results com-
pare with expectations? What problems, if any, were encoun-
tered? Was the breadboard system refined to more nearly match 
the expected system goals?  
6 System/subsystem 
model or prototype 
demonstration in a 
relevant environ-
ment.  
Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond that of TRL 5, is tested in a relevant environ-
ment. Represents a major step up in a technology’s 
demonstrated readiness. Examples include testing a pro-
totype in a high-fidelity laboratory environment or in a 
simulated operational environment.  
Results from laboratory testing of a proto-type system that is 
near the desired configuration in terms of performance, weight, 
and volume. How did the test environment differ from the op-
erational environment? Who performed the tests? How did the 
test compare with expectations? What problems, if any, were 
encountered? What are/were the plans, options, or actions to 
resolve problems before moving to the next level?  
7 System prototype 
demonstration in an 
operational envi-
ronment.  
Prototype near or at planned operational system. Repre-
sents a major step up from TRL 6 by requiring demon-
stration of an actual system prototype in an operational 
environment (e.g., in an air-craft, in a vehicle, or in 
space).  
Results from testing a prototype system in an operational envi-
ronment. Who performed the tests? How did the test compare 
with expectations? What problems, if any, were encountered? 
What are/were the plans, options, or actions to resolve problems 
before moving to the next level?  
8 Actual system com-
pleted and qualified 
through test and 
demonstration.  
Technology has been proven to work in its final form and 
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL 
represents the end of true system development. Examples 
include developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) of the 
system in its intended weapon system to determine if it 
meets design specifications.  
Results of testing the system in its final configuration under the 
expected range of environmental conditions in which it will be 
expected to operate. Assessment of whether it will meet its op-
erational requirements. What problems, if any, were encoun-
tered? What are/were the plans, options, or actions to resolve 
problems before finalizing the design?  




Actual application of the technology in its final form and 
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in 
operational test and evaluation (OT&E). Examples in-
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